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Executive summary 
 In the UK parliament the House of Commons’ primacy is well-established, both in law 
(through the Parliament Acts) and convention. A particular and well-known element of this 
financial primacy relates to “money bills”. But a lesser-known element of financial primacy is 
the “financial privilege” that the Commons can claim with respect to legislative amendments 
sent to it by the House of Lords. When the Commons “invokes” its financial privilege on 
such amendments, the Lords is expected to back down. 
 These arrangements have recently been controversial, most notably on the coalition’s 
Welfare Reform Bill in 2011-12. The invoking of financial privilege over several Lords 
amendments on high-profile matters led to allegations that the procedure was somehow 
being “abused” by ministers. The ensuing debates demonstrated that there was widespread 
lack of understanding, or indeed misunderstanding, about how the process works. This 
report therefore attempts to set out the facts, and to ask whether anything needs to change. 
 We base our analysis on documentary evidence about financial privilege over the period 
1974-2013, and on interviews with those closely involved in the process. We believe that this 
report sets out the most complete recent exposition of how financial privilege works. 
 We review practice in particular with respect to nine different complaints that have been 
made during debates about financial privilege. These range from procedural complaints – for 
example regarding lack of transparency about the definitions of what kind of amendments 
will engage financial privilege, to more political ones – such as that the government controls 
the process or that it is being applied more frequently than in the past. We conclude that 
evidence on these different complaints is mixed.  
 Some complaints are clearly justified. We find that the process lacks transparency, that 
information about it is scattered, and definitions are often unclear. It is therefore easy to see 
why both parliamentarians and outside observers of parliament are confused. This lack of 
transparency helps to feed suspicions that something untoward is going on. The confusion is 
exacerbated by the fact decisions on financial privilege are taken in the Commons, but their 
primary impact is on members of the Lords. 
 In fact our analysis finds no clear evidence that government or any other body is acting 
inappropriately. The primary reasons for more frequent clashes over financial privilege 
(which occurred when Labour was in power pre-2010, as well as under the coalition) relate to 
political changes in the Lords. That is, the chamber’s growing assertiveness, and its changed 
party balance. Most recently the coalition’s public spending cuts, occurring in a period of 
relative austerity, have put financial arguments at the heart of political debate – between 
government and opposition, and therefore Lords and Commons. 
 But the current arrangements create vulnerabilities. Decisions about financial privilege are 
primarily taken by Commons clerks, with little political cover from the Speaker. This could 
place them under too much pressure from parliamentary counsel (who draft government 
bills). Without transparency, and with decisions based on precedent, there is a risk of “creep” 
in the definitions of when financial privilege applies. 
 We also look briefly at practice in other bicameral parliaments. We find that it is very 
common for the lower house to enjoy at least a degree of financial primacy. In some cases 
restrictions on members of both chambers proposing amendments that would increase 
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spending are far harsher than in the UK. But also procedures, and different interpretations of 
rules by the two chambers, are sometimes far clearer and more explicit. 
 We thus recommend a series of changes to current practice. We believe that there should be 
clearly published definitions, and statements about why financial privilege applies to 
particular amendments, with more explicit involvement by the Commons Speaker. The 
Lords may wish to accept the Commons’ published definition, or propose a narrower one. 
For example some countries apply limits to amendments that increase spending, but not to 
ones that reduce it or change its administration. Beyond definitions, the procedures in the 
Commons with respect to financial privilege could also be streamlined.  
 In the end, financial privilege is governed by conventions rather than hard law, and the Lords 
may choose how it responds. This may continue to change over time, particularly if the 
chamber is reformed. Whether the unelected – but now relatively proportional and “expert” 
– chamber should be able to behave more assertively on financial matters is ultimately a 
political question. 
6 
 
Introduction 
In late 2011 and early 2012 the government suffered a series of defeats in the House of Lords on 
amendments to its flagship Welfare Reform Bill. Most of the defeats were on highly 
controversial matters, including the so-called “bedroom tax” and introduction of an overall 
benefit cap. All were subsequently overturned by the House of Commons, which cited its 
“financial privilege” – or right to dismiss the Lords’ demands on financial matters. As a 
consequence it was argued that the Lords should, by convention, not insist on its proposals. This 
episode provoked anger both inside and outside parliament, with claims that the government had 
misused parliamentary procedure in order to secure its policy programme, and that the incident 
could thus be considered “an abuse of privilege”.1 
 
Controversy over financial privilege was in fact nothing new. Under the previous Labour 
government, the Commons’ claim of privilege on two bills in November 2008 (the Counter-
Terrorism Bill and Planning Bill) had likewise caused complaints. Subsequently, two months 
after the controversy on the coalition’s Welfare Reform Bill, criticisms resurfaced when the 
Commons cited financial privilege in rejecting Lords amendments to the Legal Aid, Sentencing 
and Punishment of Offenders Bill.  
 
Such episodes have revealed widespread confusion about this little-known aspect of 
parliamentary procedure. They also raise bigger questions about relations between the House of 
Commons and House of Lords. While the elected Commons undoubtedly enjoys primacy, the 
unelected Lords is nonetheless respected for its expertise, and increasingly lobbied by civil 
society groups. Since reform in 1999 transformed the Lords into a “no overall control” chamber, 
it has become more assertive and has inflicted numerous defeats on government. A sense that 
procedural tactics are being used to undermine its scrutiny role thus risks not only angering 
peers, but feeding perceptions among outside observers that the parliamentary process is 
somehow being subverted. Yet at the same time few would argue against the elected Commons 
having the ultimate right to decide on important policy matters. 
 
The purpose of this report is twofold. First, it aims to throw light on current arrangements by 
clarifying the existing practices around financial privilege, which are clearly little understood. We 
hope that this will help parliamentarians, outside groups and the public better understand and 
navigate the process. Second, in the light of this information, the report seeks to evaluate 
whether current arrangements for financial privilege are appropriate, or whether they should be 
reformed. 
 
Our findings are based on detailed research into how financial privilege has operated in practice 
between October 1974 and April 2013. We have conducted analysis based on official records 
and publications, and interviewed key actors involved in the contemporary process, including 
members, and senior clerks from both Houses. In addition we draw on a much larger set of 
interviews conducted for a separate research project about the Westminster legislative process, 
including with civil servants and outside group representatives, as well as parliamentarians and 
parliamentary staff.2 
 
The main body of the report is split into seven sections. The first distils and clarifies the basic 
procedures surrounding financial privilege. This is intended to help those seeking to engage with 
the legislative process – including MPs, peers, outside groups and the public – better understand 
what many currently see as a shadowy procedure. The second section of the report goes further, 
by providing summary figures on use of financial privilege between 1974 and 2013. The third 
section draws on debate inside and outside parliament over the same period to identify nine 
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complaints that have been made about how financial privilege operates. Each of these is assessed 
against the evidence that we have collected. Next, we consider international comparisons, since 
many bicameral legislatures have special rules for dealing with financial matters. We summarise 
some of these, to evaluate whether there are useful lessons that Westminster could learn. At the 
end of the report we consider the wider politics of financial privilege, and then ask whether the 
current procedures should be reformed, making a series of policy recommendations. A final 
short section draws some overall conclusions.  
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Financial privilege: the process 
Even for many seasoned Westminster-watchers, the term “financial privilege” may be something 
of a mystery. As explained below, our interest is in a relatively narrow aspect of the House of 
Commons’ primacy over the House of Lords on financial matters. Other aspects of the 
relationship between the chambers are relatively better understood, though much is governed by 
convention and practice, rather than hard law. The Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949 set down the 
statutory framework, and it was the 1911 Act which cemented the Commons’ primacy over 
legislation. But the Parliament Acts (which were themselves based on conventions established 
over the preceding centuries) provide little guidance on how the relationship between the 
chambers operates day-to-day. 
 
The main sources of information about financial privilege are the authoritative guides to the 
interpretation of procedure in the two chambers: Erskine May for the House of Commons (most 
recently Erskine May, 24th edn., 2011: 785-98) and the Companion to the Standing Orders and Guide 
to the Proceedings of the House of Lords (or “Lords Companion”, most recently House of Lords, 2013: 
164-65). Brief summaries also appear in more widely available books on parliament written or 
contributed to by clerks (Blackburn and Kennon, 2003: 333-34; Rogers and Walters, 2006: 265-
67). Following recent controversies, some other documents have set out principles and facts 
regarding financial privilege, as discussed below. But present sources are very scattered, and in 
some respects incomplete. We believe that this report is the most extensive recent attempt to 
clarify the rules and practice of financial privilege.  
 
In this first section of the report we draw on the existing sources, as well as on official 
parliamentary records, and our interviews, in order to set out the basic facts. We begin by briefly 
clarifying what is meant by the term “financial privilege”. We then outline the most important 
recent controversies over its use, before summarising the basics of how it operates: first, how 
financial privilege is claimed by the Commons; and second, how the Lords may respond. 
 
What is financial privilege? 
Most primary legislation can be introduced into either the Commons or the Lords. In the first 
House the bill will be debated and amendments may be made. A revised version of the bill, 
incorporating any amendments, will then be sent to the second House, where the process is 
repeated. Once the bill has passed the second House, the first House will be sent a list of any 
amendments that were made. If the first House accepts these the bill is sent for Royal Assent. 
But if the first House disagrees – by rejecting or amending some amendments, or proposing 
alternative “amendments in lieu” – the bill must return again to the second House. The bill will 
then “ping pong” in this way between the two Houses until one or other backs down or a 
compromise is reached.  
 
In this report we use the term financial privilege to refer to the primacy of the Commons over any 
legislative amendment that was proposed by the Lords and has financial implications.3 If the 
Lords passes an amendment with financial implications, and the Commons subsequently rejects 
it during ping pong, the Commons will send a message to the Lords indicating that the 
amendment would affect taxation or spending and reminding peers of the Commons’ financial 
primacy. Convention suggests that the Lords should respect this by not insisting on its 
amendment. But such arrangements are entirely governed by precedent and convention rather 
than fixed rules. 
 
Financial privilege is one element within a broader set of principles and practices referred to as 
the Commons’ financial primacy. The financial primacy of the Commons dates back many 
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centuries and was formalised by two Commons resolutions in the late 17th century. The first, 
from 1671, states: “That in all aids given to the King by the Commons, the rate of tax ought not 
to be altered by the Lords” (quoted in Erskine May, 24th edn., 2011: 786). The second resolution 
(ibid) is more detailed, from 1678: 
 
That all aids and supplies, and aids to his Majesty in Parliament, are the sole gift of the 
Commons; and all bills for the granting of any such aids and supplies ought to begin with the 
Commons; and that it is the undoubted and sole right of the Commons to direct, limit, and 
appoint in such bills the ends, purposes, considerations, conditions, limitations, and qualifications 
of such grants, which ought not to be changed or altered by the House of Lords.  
 
Aside from financial privilege, the Commons’ financial primacy has various other implications 
for how parliament operates, some of which are better known. There are two overlapping 
categories of bill that are singled out for special treatment by the Lords. The first is those 
certified by the Commons Speaker as money bills because their provisions relate solely to financial 
matters, including national taxation, public money and loans. Under the terms of the Parliament 
Act 1911, money bills can only be delayed minimally by the Lords. The second category 
comprises bills of aids and supplies (usually Finance Bills or Consolidated Fund Bills), which – as 
indicated in the resolution above – must always begin in the Commons and cannot be amended 
by the Lords. In practice both types of bill generally have an expedited passage through the 
Lords, with no committee stage and no amendments passed. 
 
With the exception of bills of aids and supplies, which are brought in on financial resolutions, 
the Commons must agree either a money resolution (to authorise expenditure)4 and/or a ways and 
means resolution (to authorise taxation) for all other bills that have financial implications. Where 
such a bill begins in the Lords rather than the Commons, the Lords will pass an amendment 
known as a privilege amendment before sending the bill to the Commons. The privilege amendment 
states (fictitiously, in order to facilitate Lords’ scrutiny) that nothing in the bill shall have financial 
implications. Its only purpose is to formally respect the Commons’ financial primacy, and it is 
removed from the bill at committee stage in the Commons. 
 
Our focus in this report is only on the first of these mechanisms: i.e. the application of financial 
privilege to Lords amendments to legislation.5 Although mechanisms such as money bills may be 
higher profile, the application of financial privilege to Lords amendments is a far more frequent 
occurrence. As indicated below (see Table 1, p. 15), this occurred with respect to hundreds of 
Lords amendments over the period 2000-12. It therefore arguably has greater implications for 
how parliament operates day-to-day. 
 
Recent controversies 
Financial privilege has provoked confusion and complaints within parliament for decades, but it 
has become particularly contentious in the last few years. Some of the recent controversies have 
led to publications, mostly from parliamentary authorities or select committees, setting out 
aspects of how financial privilege works. Here we review the most recent developments.  
 
An important flashpoint came in November 2008, when Lords amendments to two bills were 
rejected by the Commons on the grounds of financial privilege. On the Counter-Terrorism Bill, 
the Commons cited financial privilege when rejecting a Lords amendment designed to facilitate 
the disclosure of information held by the government relating to a person’s fingerprints and 
other samples, and to enable the person to request its destruction. Upon the bill’s return to the 
Lords, Crossbench peer Viscount Bledisloe said that he was “amazed” at the Commons’ use of 
financial privilege, and that the Lords was “faced with a remarkable attitude” from the lower 
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chamber (HL Deb 24 Nov 2008, cc1291-92). In the same month, the Commons cited financial 
privilege when rejecting a Lords amendment to the Planning Bill, about regulation-making 
powers relating to the “Community Infrastructure Levy”. When the bill returned to the floor of 
the Lords – the day after the controversy on the Counter-Terrorism Bill – similar concerns were 
expressed. Shadow Leader of the Lords, Lord Strathclyde, claimed that the government had 
given the impression of claiming financial privilege “in cases of doubt simply to stifle debate” 
(HL Deb 25 Nov 2008, c1359), while Labour peer Baroness Hollis of Heigham warned of “deep 
unease [...] about where the principle may go” (HL Deb 25 Nov 2008, c1365). 
 
In response to the criticism, in February 2009 Baroness Royall of Blaisdon, then Leader of the 
Lords, deposited in the House of Lords Library a memorandum outlining the action that she had 
taken to address concerns. She noted that “the operation of Commons financial privilege is a 
matter for the House of Commons alone”, but explained that she had discussed the issue within 
government to ensure that “wherever possible, dialogue between the two Houses can be 
resolved without similar conflicts arising”. As her statement is not publicly available, we have 
reproduced it in Appendix 1. Royall attached a short briefing paper written by Michael Pownall, 
then Clerk of the Parliaments (the most senior clerk in the Lords), which has subsequently been 
published by the House of Lords Constitution Committee (2011: 8-11). It outlined what financial 
privilege is, its scope, and how the Lords may respond, as well as very briefly commenting on 
some criticisms of it. Royall also attached some summary statistics on how financial privilege had 
been used in practice, which we return to below. 
 
Financial privilege again triggered some complaints in the early months of coalition government. 
This time the bill in question was the Identity Documents Bill, which repealed the previous 
Labour government’s Identity Cards Bill. In the Lords, the government was defeated on an 
amendment to allow those who already held identity cards to claim a £30 refund. The 
amendment was rejected by the Commons, which cited its financial privilege. When the bill 
returned to the Lords, Labour peer Lord Howarth of Newport warned that the procedure risked 
“mak[ing] an absolute mockery of our claim to be a revising Chamber or, indeed, a proper 
debating Chamber” (HL 21 Dec 2010, c1004). Around the same time, the Savings Accounts and 
Health in Pregnancy Grant Bill was controversially designated by the Commons Speaker as a 
money bill, thus restricting the Lords’ ability to amend it. Taken together, these two episodes led 
the Constitution Committee to publish a short report entitled Money Bills and Commons Financial 
Privilege, which sought to clarify both procedures (Constitution Committee, 2011). 
 
Yet the high-point in controversy over financial privilege came in 2012 when parliament was 
debating the Welfare Reform Bill. During the bill’s initial passage the Lords inflicted seven 
defeats on the government, most of which related to high-profile and controversial matters 
including the so-called “bedroom tax”, the benefit cap (on an amendment proposed by a Church 
of England bishop), support for disabled people, and reform of the child maintenance system. 
The Commons overturned all seven defeats citing financial privilege, to which some peers 
responded with opprobrium. Former Conservative chancellor Lord Lawson of Blaby suggested 
that financial privilege had been “invoked promiscuously” in a way that was “completely 
contrary to the conventions of the constitution” (HL Deb 2 Feb 2012, c1674), while former 
Commons Speaker, Baroness Boothroyd, accused the government of behaving in a “very heavy-
handed manner” (HL Deb 14 Feb 2012, c688). Former Conservative Lord Chancellor Lord 
Mackay of Clashfern (the proposer of one of the amendments rejected by the Commons) 
suggested that it had been “a waste of time [to] debate provisions which turn out to be 
completely sacrosanct because of the decision on privilege made” (HL Deb 1 Feb 2012, c1569). 
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The episode also provoked anger and confusion outside parliament. Writing in the Guardian, 
journalist Polly Toynbee claimed that the bill had been “railroaded through” parliament using 
financial privilege.6 The director of policy at Gingerbread, a charity (representing single parents) 
that had campaigned on the bill, accused the government of employing “strong-arm tactics” and 
warned that the use of financial privilege set it on a “dangerous path if it becomes common 
practice in future”.7 Reflecting on these events, legal academic Jeff King wrote a blog post in 
which he concluded that it was “an abuse of the privilege to use it to foreclose the revising role 
of the Lords on matters of social policy not relating directly to taxation or supply of money”.8 
Confusion abounded in the media, with misleading and contradictory claims such as that the 
procedure was “used each year for major financial measures such as the Budget”9 and that it was 
“a rarely used parliamentary device”.10 As indicated above, neither of these statements was 
correct. 
 
When the Welfare Reform Bill returned to the House of Lords, a total of seven amendments in 
lieu were agreed by peers, all of which themselves were judged by the Commons to have engaged 
financial privilege. Five of them – relating to support for disabled people and to the child 
maintenance system – were agreed with the support of the minister, and were subsequently 
accepted by the Commons with financial privilege waived. The remaining two amendments were 
proposed by Lord Best – relating to the bedroom tax – and were agreed against the 
government’s wishes. The Commons again disagreed to these, again invoking financial privilege. 
When the bill returned to the Lords, Lord Best chose not to force another division. 
 
The furore over the Welfare Reform Bill led clerks in both Houses to issue short explanatory 
documents. David Beamish, Clerk of the Parliaments, published a note in which he emphasised 
two points: that the Commons always cites financial privilege when rejecting a Lords amendment 
that has spending implications, and that the Lords is free to respond to the Commons’ claim of 
financial privilege by proposing an amendment in lieu (Beamish, 2012). Two papers were also 
published jointly by Robert Rogers, Clerk of the House of Commons (the most senior official in 
that chamber), and Jacqy Sharpe, Clerk of Legislation in the Commons (the official directly 
responsible for designating Lords amendments) (Rogers and Sharpe, 2012a; 2012b). These were 
particularly helpful in explaining the practical process by which financial privilege comes to be 
cited on an amendment, including clarifying the role of the clerks. They also included some more 
up to date statistics on how privilege had been used in practice, to which we return below. 
 
In April 2012, financial privilege was once again claimed by the Commons when rejecting a 
series of amendments to the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill. One of 
the amendments was proposed by Crossbench peer and senior lawyer Lord Pannick, who sought 
explicitly to write into the bill the purpose of legal aid without requiring any additional 
expenditure. His amendment stated that the change should be made “within the resources made 
available” in the bill, and in introducing it he claimed that “the amendment does not require any 
further expenditure by the Government” (HL Deb 5 Mar 2012, c1559). Yet, when rejecting the 
amendment, the Commons cited its financial privilege. Pannick responded with an alternative 
amendment, which sought to ensure that “individuals have access to legal services that 
effectively meet their needs, subject to the resources which the Lord Chancellor decides, in his 
discretion, to make available” (HL Deb 23 April 2012, c1560). But this was likewise rejected 
citing financial privilege. At the next round of ping pong Lord Pannick dropped the proposal, 
but argued that it was “quite inappropriate to apply financial privilege to an amendment that 
expressly stated that financial resources were a matter for the discretion of the Lord Chancellor” 
(HL Deb 25 Apr 2012, c1796). 
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The question of financial privilege has also sometimes featured in wider debates about the 
relationship between the chambers, and about Lords reform. We return to these issues later in 
the report. 
 
How the Commons claims financial privilege 
When the Commons receives Lords amendments, it is the Clerk of Legislation, acting under the 
authority of the Speaker, who is responsible for checking whether any of them have financial 
implications (or in technical terms, “engage” financial privilege). Before the Commons debate on 
the Lords amendments takes place, any that are judged to do so will have a “P” recorded against 
them on the list of amendments given to the Speaker. This process is known as the 
“designation” of amendments. In difficult cases the Clerk of Legislation may consult with 
colleagues but, despite the procedure formally taking place under the Speaker’s authority, only 
very rarely with the Speaker himself. Indeed the briefing from the Commons clerks indicates that 
“[t]he Speaker is not directly involved” with this decision (Rogers and Sharpe, 2012a). 
 
When the Commons debate takes place, it has been common in recent years for the Speaker or 
Deputy Speaker to formally identify at the start whether any amendments engage financial 
privilege, usually specifying which ones. In response to the controversy on the Welfare Reform 
Bill the Commons clerks now list on the Commons order papers that are provided to MPs (and 
are publicly available online) those amendments, if any, that engage financial privilege.  
 
MPs have three possible options for how to respond to any Lords amendment and, in the case 
of amendments that have been identified as engaging financial privilege, this choice is crucial in 
what happens next. The Commons can: 
 
 Agree the amendment. By virtue of accepting the amendment, the Commons is judged to 
have “waived” its financial privileges. A special entry is made in the Journals of the House of 
Commons to this effect. 
 Propose an alternative. Rather than accepting or rejecting the amendment outright, the 
Commons may suggest an alternative proposal – most commonly by disagreeing to the 
Lords’ proposal but at the same time suggesting an “amendment in lieu”.11 In this case, the 
Lords Companion states that “the question whether the Lords amendment infringes 
privilege does not arise” (House of Lords, 2013: 165). 
 Disagree to the amendment. Whenever the Commons disagrees to a Lords amendment 
without also proposing an alternative, it sends the Lords a short, formal “Reason” for its 
decision. The text of the Reason is agreed immediately after the debate by a committee of 
five MPs known as a Reasons Committee. Where the amendment engages financial privilege, 
the long-standing practice of the Commons is to always send a financial privilege Reason (or 
“privilege Reason”), which always ends with the words: “and the Commons do not offer any 
further Reason, trusting this Reason may be deemed sufficient”. We refer to this as 
“invoking” financial privilege. 
 
In practice, financial privilege may be little mentioned (if at all) when the Lords amendments are 
debated in the Commons. Aside from an announcement by the Speaker (or Deputy Speaker) 
that financial privilege applies, ministers and other MPs often make no reference to the financial 
status of the Lords amendments. Instead the debate tends to focus on other matters, in terms of 
the amendments’ more general merits.  
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How the Lords may respond 
When the bill is returned to the Lords, the Commons Reasons are printed on the Lords order 
papers next to any amendments that have been disagreed to. According to the Lords 
Companion, where a financial privilege Reason has been given, “the Lords do not insist on their 
amendment” but may propose amendments in lieu (House of Lords, 2013: 165). This is not a 
hard rule, since (unlike in the Commons) there is no means of ruling a Lords amendment out of 
order – in particular, the Lord Speaker does not have this power. Nonetheless Erskine May 
states that the Commons’ “hint of privilege is generally accepted by the Lords, and the 
amendment is not insisted on” (24th edn., 2011: 792). We are aware of only one occasion when 
the Lords did not follow this convention. Erskine May  indicates that this occurred in 1930, 
when the Lords insisted on several amendments to the Unemployment Insurance (No 2) Bill on 
which financial privilege had been invoked. Interestingly, the Commons did not then insist on its 
disagreement to the amendments, but instead proposed amendments to them. 
 
In contrast, it is not considered contrary to the convention for the Lords to respond to financial 
privilege with an alternative proposition (e.g. an amendment in lieu), or to do so for as many 
rounds of ping pong as it wishes. Out of the 160 amendments on which financial privilege was 
invoked during the period 1974-2013 (as further discussed below), we found that the Lords 
responded in 19 cases by agreeing one or more amendments in lieu (representing 22 
amendments in lieu in total).12 These included the amendments in 2012 by Lord Best to the 
Welfare Reform Bill and Lord Pannick to the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of 
Offenders Bill cited above. 
 
A particular area of confusion is whether there are any restrictions on what the Lords may 
propose as an alternative. Any such restriction (like the limitation on insistence) would be a 
matter of convention, rather than hard rules or law. This question was touched upon in 2005-06 
by the Joint Committee on Conventions, which met to consider whether the conventions 
governing the relationship between the two Houses should be codified. The committee’s 
establishment responded to concerns that conventions had been coming under pressure 
following Lords reform in 1999, particularly with respect to the “Salisbury convention” on 
government manifesto bills, and the chamber’s ability to veto secondary legislation. Although the 
issue of financial privilege was not central to the committee’s inquiry, its conclusion on this 
matter has gone on to be widely quoted.  
 
The committee based its conclusion particularly on evidence from Paul Hayter and Roger Sands, 
then the most senior clerks in the Lords and Commons respectively. Hayter noted in his written 
evidence that the Lords had responded to financial privilege Reasons with amendments in lieu 
on three bills in the 2003-04 session, often making only minor modifications to avoid a formal 
insistence (Joint Committee on Conventions, 2006b: Ev 90-91).13 The topic was then discussed 
when the two clerks gave oral evidence to the committee. When asked whether the Lords was 
“straining the conventions” by proposing such amendments in lieu, Hayter suggested that it was 
free to “provide an alternative […] which does not infringe financial privilege”, while Sands 
suggested that “if another amendment in lieu of the original one is then offered which quite 
clearly is also going to fall foul of financial privilege because it is only a very minor variant of the 
previous one then I think that is straining the convention” (Joint Committee on Conventions, 
2006b: Ev 110). Consequently the committee’s report concluded that “[i]f the Commons have 
disagreed to Lords Amendments on grounds of financial privilege, it is contrary to convention 
for the Lords to send back Amendments in lieu which clearly invite the same response” (Joint 
Committee on Conventions, 2006a: 67). 
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But whether this really represents a convention of the Lords is disputed. In 2008, Labour Leader 
of the House of Lords Baroness Royall stated that “[b]y convention, any amendment in lieu 
must not clearly invite the same response from the Commons” (HL Deb 25 Nov 2008, c1359). 
Lord Strathclyde, while Leader of the House of Lords, likewise referred to this conclusion with 
approval (HL Deb 2 Feb 2012, c1673). However the Joint Committee on Conventions (2006a: 
79) had recommended that the House of Lords should consider adding the wording to the Lords 
Companion, which sets out the chamber’s official procedures and conventions. Although its 
report was debated in the Lords on a motion to “take note with approval”, such a change has 
never been put into effect. In his 2012 briefing David Beamish, the current Clerk of the 
Parliaments, thus confirmed that “the House [of Lords] remains formally free to send back any 
amendment in lieu” (Beamish, 2012). 
 
In any case it is not obvious what it would mean for an amendment to “clearly invite the same 
response”. The oral evidence above could support either a wide or a narrow interpretation of the 
phrase: Sands’ comment could be seen as interpreting this narrowly (i.e. because the subsequent 
amendment is “only a very minor variant”), while Hayter’s comment suggests a wider definition 
encompassing any amendment potentially engaging financial privilege. Certainly, a wide 
interpretation does not appear to have been observed in practice, either before or after the Joint 
Committee on Conventions report. Of the 22 amendments in lieu sent back by the Lords 1974-
2013, 19 themselves engaged financial privilege, including two (on the Housing Bill (2003-04) 
and the Teaching and Higher Education Bill (1997-98)) that were proposed in the Lords by the 
government itself. 
 
A third option open to the Lords is to pass a motion protesting against the Commons’ claim of 
financial privilege. Such a motion was tabled (but not pressed to a vote) in 1988 when financial 
privilege was invoked on amendments to the Local Government Finance Bill, which introduced 
the so-called “poll tax”. Labour peer Lord McIntosh of Haringey tabled an amendment to the 
government’s motion that the Lords should not insist on its amendments, which would have 
added that the Lords “regrets that Her Majesty’s Government are seeking to oppose Lords 
amendment 10 not on its merits but on the ground of Commons financial privilege” (HL Deb 
26 Jul 1988, c186). The motion would have had no substantive effect, but would have 
communicated a symbolic message to the Commons.14 
 
A final “nuclear” option open to the Lords would be to decline to pass the bill at all, for example 
through a motion to adjourn consideration until a date after the session has ended. Although no 
longer used, such motions until recently provided the Lords with a means of occasionally 
declining to give bills a second reading.15 If the chamber chose to take such action, no 
amendments would be returned to the Commons and the entire bill would be lost. For so long 
as such options exist, any limitations on the Lords’ power with respect to particular amendments 
can always ultimately be overridden – though that power could of course in turn be overridden 
by the Commons, through invoking the Parliament Acts.  
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Key statistics on financial privilege 
Some of the recent publications referred to above have included quantitative data on the use of 
financial privilege, and these have been quoted at times to support particular conclusions in the 
debate. However, these statistics have not presented a particularly full or clear picture. In this 
section we begin with the official data, but then supplement them with more detailed 
information based on our own research. 
 
Official published statistics 
Statistics issued with Baroness Royall of Blaisdon’s memorandum in 2009 specified the number 
of Lords amendments in each session from 2000-01 to 2007-08 on which financial privilege had 
been waived and invoked by the Commons (House of Lords, 2009). The data published by the 
Commons clerks (Rogers and Sharpe, 2012b) were both more detailed, and brought these figures 
up to date. In Table 1 we show similar figures to those used in these two published sources, 
relating to waiving and invocation of financial privilege. These were provided to us by the House 
of Lords Library, and correct some errors in the earlier published figures. 
 
Table 1: Official data on waiving and invocation of financial privilege, 2000-12 
Session A: Lords 
amendments on 
which financial 
privilege waived 
B: Lords 
amendments on 
which financial 
privilege invoked 
Total A+B** 
2010-12* 158 12 170 
2009-10 14 3 17 
2008-09 48 2 50 
2007-08 154 7 161 
2006-07 0 10 10 
2005-06 6 0 6 
2004-05 5 0 5 
2003-04 103 12 115 
2002-03 29 4 33 
2001-02 91 5 96 
2000-01 2 1 3 
Total 610 56 666 
Source: House of Lords Library. 
* To February 2012. 
** This is not the total number of Lords amendments on which financial privilege was 
engaged, as it excludes amendments that engaged financial privilege to which the 
Commons responded with an alternative proposal (e.g. an amendment in lieu). 
 
These kinds of official data, which have been used to defend existing practice, show that the 
Commons has waived financial privilege far more frequently than it has invoked it. Indeed, once 
financial privilege was judged to have been engaged, the ratio between these outcomes is around 
11:1. In her memorandum Baroness Royall thus claimed that the data showed that “financial 
privilege has not often given rise to difficulties for the Lords” and that “in many cases, the 
Commons decides not to exert its financial privilege” (see Appendix 1). Likewise, the Commons 
clerks in 2012 cited the data as demonstrating that “[t]he Commons waives its privilege far more 
often than not” (Rogers and Sharpe, 2012a: 2). 
 
But, although these data were intended to clarify practice, they also leave some important 
questions unanswered. The most significant omission is that they do not distinguish between 
Lords amendments that were supported by the government and those that were passed against 
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its wishes. We know that the great majority of amendments agreed in the House of Lords are 
proposed in the name of ministers. For example, figures provided by the House of Lords Public 
Bill Office for the session 2010-12 show that there were 2405 amendments agreed in the House 
of Lords, of which 2268 (94%) were government-backed amendments. It is not surprising that 
the House of Commons – acting on the advice of ministers – should waive its financial privilege 
in the case of such amendments.16 What is more important is to ask what happens in the case of 
government defeats in the House of Lords. But this information is not available from the 
recently published summary data. Isolating data for Lords defeats presents a very different 
picture. 
 
Financial privilege and Lords defeats: four social security bills 
To explore the effects of financial privilege on Lords defeats, we first selected four social security 
bills from the period 1989-2012. Social security bills seem particularly likely to attract 
amendments with financial implications, and these four bills span periods of Conservative, 
Labour and coalition governments. We recorded the origin and outcome of every Lords 
amendment to these bills that was judged by the Commons to have engaged financial privilege. 
Out of a total 690 Lords amendments, 123 engaged financial privilege. Of these, 91 were 
government-supported amendments and 31 were defeats (one was a hybrid case). For 90 
amendments financial privilege was waived, but all of these were originally passed in the Lords 
with government support. By contrast, financial privilege was invoked on 26 amendments – all 
of them resulting from government defeats in the House of Lords.  
 
Table 2: Financial privilege on amendments to four social security bills 1989-2012, by whether 
government supported amendment or defeat 
  
TOTAL 
Govt 
support Defeat Hybrid* Total 
Total Lords amendments 690 
LAs with financial implications 91 31 1 123 
- agreed & privilege waived 90 0 0 90 
- disagreed & privilege invoked 0 26 0 26 
- amended the LA (privilege waived) 0 0 1 1 
- amended words restored to bill 0 1 0 1 
- amendments in lieu 1 4 0 5 
Bills: Social Security Bill (1989-90), Welfare Reform and Pensions Bill (1998-99), Pensions Bill 
(2007-08) and Welfare Reform Bill (2010-12). 
*In one case the Lords amendment was a combination of an amendment sponsored by the 
government and one that resulted from a government defeat. 
 
Table 2 also illustrates a second gap in the official data, which is that they do not specify how 
frequently the Commons responded to Lords amendments that engaged financial privilege by 
proposing amendments in lieu (and thus not invoking financial privilege). Of the remaining five 
Lords defeats not responded to with financial privilege invoked, the Commons proposed an 
alternative amendment – thus avoiding a financial privilege Reason.  
 
Examination of these four bills allows us to conclude, unsurprisingly, that government and non-
government backed Lords amendments attract very different responses in the Commons with 
respect to financial privilege. Where privilege is engaged on government amendments it is likely 
almost always to be waived. In contrast, where privilege is engaged on non-government 
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amendments it is far more likely to be invoked. Indeed, with very few exceptions, cases of 
privilege being invoked tend to apply only in response to government defeats in the Lords. 
 
Financial privilege and all Lords defeats 1974-2013 
A third limitation of the officially collated statistics is that they only cover the period from 2000 
to 2012. This makes it difficult to assess whether practice has evolved over a longer time period. 
We therefore conducted further analysis on data going back to 1974. Here we focused only on 
cases where financial privilege was invoked (rather than simply designated), and thus largely on 
Lords defeats. We searched the Journals of the House of Commons to identify every Lords 
amendment on which financial privilege was invoked between October 1974 and April 2013. 
This period covers 38 parliamentary sessions and nine parliaments (the last of which is 
incomplete). Over this period financial privilege was invoked on a total of 160 Lords 
amendments to 61 bills, as shown in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Number of amendments and proportion of Lords defeats on which financial privilege was 
invoked, 1974-2013 
 Cases where financial 
privilege (FP) invoked 
Total Lords 
defeats 
% of Lords 
defeats on 
which FP 
invoked 
Mean no. of 
amendments 
annually on 
which FP 
invoked**  
No. 
bills 
No. 
amend
-ments 
No. 
Lords 
defeats  
2010-13 (Coalition)* 4 24 18 74 24% 8.0 
2005-10 (Labour) 7 22 11 175 6% 4.4 
2001-05 (Labour) 9 21 14 245 6% 5.4 
1997-2001 (Labour) 9 23 14 108 13% 5.6 
1992-97 (Conservative) 4 7 5 62 8% 1.7 
1987-92 (Conservative) 10 24 16 72 22% 5.0 
1983-87 (Conservative) 3 3 3 62 5% 0.7 
1979-83 (Conservative) 0 0 0 45 0% 0.0 
1974-79 (Labour) 15 36 21 355 6% 7.9 
Total 61 160 102 1198 9% 4.1 
Source: For defeats, House of Lords website, UCL data, Shell (1985: 17); for all other figures, our research based on 
House of Commons Journals and other official parliamentary sources. 
*Parliament incomplete. 
**Calculated per month of the parliament and scaled up to years. 
 
As the table shows, the number of amendments on which financial privilege was invoked 
(second column of figures) and the average number of such cases per year (final column) have 
fluctuated somewhat over time. The data for the 2010 parliament are necessarily incomplete, and 
may well change, but the rate at which financial privilege has been invoked is slightly above that 
during the most recent period of Labour government, with a rate more similar to that under the 
previous 1974-79 Labour government. During the Conservative Thatcher and Major 
governments it was less common (with the exception of 1987-92) – which is unsurprising given 
the lower number of defeats (as shown in the fourth column of figures in the table) at that time. 
 
We traced each invocation of financial privilege over this period, to identify which defeat (if any) 
it resulted from. In total, the 160 amendments resulted – either directly or indirectly – from 102 
individual Lords defeats (“indirectly” in the sense that sometimes the defeat itself did not engage 
financial privilege, but this was invoked against a consequential amendment). The main reason 
for the discrepancy between these two numbers is that other amendments consequential on 
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defeats also often had financial privilege invoked. In total, 153 of the 160 amendments on which 
privilege was invoked resulted from a government defeat in the Lords, and the remaining seven 
were also on non-government amendments (usually resulting from a free vote). This clearly 
reinforces the conclusion above that the waiving of financial privilege is routinely applied to 
government amendments from the Lords, while the invocation of financial privilege only really 
comes into play on non-government amendments. 
 
This analysis also allows us to consider the proportion of Lords defeats in each parliament on 
which financial privilege was invoked, which is shown in the fifth column of figures in the table. 
Across the whole period, 9% of Lords defeats were responded to by the Commons invoking 
financial privilege on at least one of the resulting amendments. The proportion exceeded a tenth 
in only three parliaments: 1987-92 (22%), 1997-2001 (13%) and 2010-13 (24%). In terms of 
individual sessions, the 2010-12 session, when the Welfare Reform Bill was before parliament, 
saw 17 of 48 defeats (around one third) responded to with a financial privilege Reason. The only 
other session to reach this proportion was 1989-90, when the number of defeats was much lower 
(20, out of which seven were responded to in this way).  
 
These figures help to explain why financial privilege became so controversial in the 2010-12 
session. The number of times that financial privilege was invoked, and the proportion of Lords 
defeats to which this applied, was relatively higher than it had been in most of the preceding 
years. But it was certainly not so wildly different as to appear unprecedented. The politics of the 
situation is also however crucially shaped by what happens subsequently to Lords defeats: 
including the extent to which the Lords wishes to insist on its amendments. We return to this 
later in the report. But first, we survey some of the more specific objections that have been made 
with respect to financial privilege. 
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Complaints about financial privilege 
Over our period of study (1974-2013), a range of specific complaints have been made about how 
financial privilege operates. We have identified nine distinct though overlapping criticisms, based 
on records of parliamentary debates, interviews with key actors, and comments made in the 
media. While some of these complaints are important and longstanding, others have been made 
relatively rarely. They are that: 
 
 the procedure for financial privilege is opaque; 
 there are no clear rules for which amendments engage financial privilege; 
 financial privilege is being interpreted increasingly broadly; 
 no explanation is given for why financial privilege applies; 
 the privilege Reason doesn’t reflect why the amendment was rejected; 
 decisions on financial privilege exclude MPs as well as peers; 
 financial privilege is controlled by government for political ends; 
 financial privilege weakens the Lords’ capacity to scrutinise legislation; and 
 financial privilege is being invoked more often than it was in the past. 
 
The complaints range from the purely procedural to those which are far more political, and the 
above list starts with the former and leads gradually to the latter. In the following subsections we 
consider each of these complaints in turn, evaluating the extent to which they seem to be 
justified by the evidence. 
 
Complaint 1: The procedure for financial privilege is opaque 
The first complaint about financial privilege is that the procedure is unclear, and difficult for 
people to understand. This confusion has been evident in many of the parliamentary debates 
about financial privilege. In 1988 when the Lords debated the Local Government Finance Bill, 
which legislated for the so-called “poll tax”, Labour peer Baroness Jeger confessed to feeling 
“extremely confused” and “mystified” by the process (HL Deb 26 July 1988, cc156-57). More 
recently, one MP who was active on the Welfare Reform Bill told us that financial privilege was 
something “I never got properly sorted out in my head”. Clerks that we interviewed confirmed 
that they observed what one described as “incomplete understanding” of financial privilege, 
particularly in the Lords. Indeed even Lords clerks themselves appear not to fully understand the 
process followed in the Commons. 
 
Such confusion about how financial privilege works is not surprising. For many people, the most 
obvious place to turn to for an indication of how financial privilege works might be the House 
of Commons standing orders for public business – but the term appears nowhere in this 
document. Detail is provided in Erskine May, but its section on this topic is somewhat unclear, 
and leaves several important questions unanswered. Its consideration of financial privilege begins 
with the Commons receiving “amendments which infringe the privileges of the Commons” 
(24th edn., 2011: 792), but it is entirely silent on the question of who decides whether an 
amendment falls into this category and what the process is for determining it. This helps to 
explain the widespread perception that it is the government that makes this decision (see 
complaint 7 below). Erskine May (ibid) is also unclear on how the Commons may respond to a 
Lords amendment that engages financial privilege, indicating only two choices: “to disagree with 
the amendments on the ground of privilege, or to agree with them, waiving privilege specifically 
for that purpose”.17 The section about financial privilege does not mention that the Commons 
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may respond to such an amendment by proposing an alternative, which would avoid financial 
privilege being invoked. 
 
Some of this lack of clarity has been addressed in subsequent briefings by the clerks. In 
particular, the 2012 paper by Robert Rogers and Jacqy Sharpe distinguishes more clearly between 
the role of the Clerk of Legislation in deciding whether an amendment has financial implications 
and the subsequent political decision taken by MPs (Rogers and Sharpe, 2012a). Likewise, there 
is obvious confusion – or indeed disagreement – regarding how the Lords can respond, as 
outlined above. This was clarified to some extent in the briefing from David Beamish (2012). 
 
Yet confusion remains for two reasons. First, the existing accounts remain scattered, and it is left 
to individuals to piece together a more complete account of how financial privilege works. Even 
members struggle to make sense of the situation, and those wishing to understand matters from 
outside parliament – e.g. in the media and lobby groups – are unlikely to find all of the relevant 
briefing notes, or to access Erskine May. Unlike standing orders and the Lords Companion, the 
latter is not available on the parliamentary website and can only be found in libraries. The 
publication of our report is intended to help, but cannot be an adequate substitute for a single, 
trusted account from within parliament itself.  
 
The second reason for confusion is that even those accounts that exist still leave some important 
questions unanswered. These include the extent of the government’s involvement in designation 
of amendments (see complaint 7 below) and, most importantly, the criteria against which clerks 
judge whether an amendment engages financial privilege (complaint 2). How the Lords may 
respond, meanwhile, remains a matter of dispute. This lack of clarity of course would make the 
writing of a single, authoritative account very difficult. 
 
Complaint 2: There are no clear rules for which amendments engage financial 
privilege 
Complaint 
The second complaint can be seen as a special case of the first: that it is difficult to understand 
why financial privilege is considered to apply in the designation of certain amendments. This 
makes it difficult for peers, in particular, to know where the boundaries lie. One MP suggested to 
us that “it certainly felt at times as though it was pretty arbitrary, that you could reject almost 
anything on the basis of financial privilege if you felt like it, you could construct an argument 
around financial privilege”. 
 
During parliamentary debates, a number of reasons have been suggested as to why financial 
privilege should not apply to particular amendments. They include that: 
 
 the amendment involved a relatively small amount of expenditure;18 
 the amendment reduced rather than increased expenditure;19 
 the amendment did not change the amount of expenditure, but merely redistributed it;20 
 the amendment concerned a procedural matter, such as regulation-making powers;21 
 the amendment concerned a fee on users rather than taxation;22 
 the amendment concerned local taxation, on which the Commons usually waives its 
financial privilege.23 
 
Assessment 
The official documents are remarkably unclear as to where the boundaries of financial privilege 
are drawn in practice, particularly in borderline cases. The recent note from the senior Commons 
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clerks (Rogers and Sharpe, 2012a) made this process sound quite simple and uncontroversial, 
stating that: 
 
[The Clerk of Legislation] assesses whether each amendment has a financial effect. This is 
normally very straightforward – it’s fairly obvious that an amendment, if made, would affect 
expenditure under the Bill, or would involve the levying of a charge. 
 
Erskine May nonetheless points out that the Commons interprets the scope of its financial 
privilege very widely: 
 
With regard to the charges in respect of which they claim privilege, the Commons treat as a breach 
of privilege by the Lords not merely the imposition or increase of such a charge but also any 
alteration, whether by increase or reduction, of its amount or of its duration, mode of assessment, 
levy, collection, appropriation or management; and in addition, any alteration in respect of the 
persons who pay, receive, manage, or control it, or in respect of the limits within which it is leviable. 
 (24th edn., 2011: 787) 
 
This suggests three ways by which the Lords can engage the Commons’ privilege by amending 
taxation or spending: by increasing it, reducing it, or altering it in some other way. If this 
principle were applied rigidly, a very high number of Lords amendments would be likely to fall 
within its remit, as almost every substantive provision has some resource implications. Erskine 
May does include a small number of examples of occasions on which financial privilege has been 
applied, but they are far from exhaustive. What is missing from all of the official accounts is 
anything approaching a transparent set of criteria against which decisions are made in practice 
about whether an amendment engages financial privilege or not. This is particularly important 
with respect to less clear-cut cases such as those indicated above. We have uncovered a number 
of amendments falling into categories such as these, on which it might be considered surprising 
that financial privilege was invoked (see complaint 3 below). 
 
In order to clarify arrangements, we attempted to obtain a clear statement of how decisions 
about the scope of financial privilege are taken in practice. Based on our discussions with those 
involved in the process, we found two broad perspectives on how decisions are made. Some 
argue that the designation of amendments is conducted on the basis of precedent, using historic 
records held by the Commons Clerk of Legislation. Others, however, argued that financial 
privilege actually operates (and even should operate) on the basis of instinct, “smell” and “feel” 
rather than precise rules. One official described as an “illusion” the idea that designation of 
amendments is determined legalistically on the basis of precedent. Another advised us: “don’t try 
and look for any clever principle that runs through all the cases” as “there’s a lot of 
inconsistency”. This clearly makes it difficult for anyone to understand the rules, and risks 
allegations that the goalposts can be moved. 
 
The closest we have come to an official explanation is an internal guide that is used by 
parliamentary counsel (the government’s legal drafters) to guide their own assessment about 
what is covered by financial privilege. As this has not previously been published, we reproduce it 
in Appendix 2. This document highlights the inadequacy of the official, public guides. It 
confirms that financial privilege has been taken to encompass “fees chargeable by a public body” 
on the basis that these bodies would otherwise require public funding, yet this is not specified in 
any of the public documents. It also states that “the Parliamentary procedure for secondary 
legislation making financial arrangements” would “probably” engage financial privilege, but 
neither this nor any of the public documents make any comment on when privilege would or 
would not apply in such cases. 
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In the case of Lord Pannick’s amendment to the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of 
Offenders Bill referred to earlier, a clear attempt was made by the proposers of the amendment 
to demonstrate that it had no financial consequences, yet it was returned from the Commons 
with financial privilege invoked. Responding when the bill returned to the Lords, Lord Pannick 
claimed that “[t]he original amendment made it very clear that access to legal services would 
come within the resources made available by the Lord Chancellor and in accordance with the 
rest of Part 1, and therefore that amendment had no financial implications whatever” (HL Deb 
23 April 2012, c1561). Which criteria such amendments are being judged against does appear, at 
least to some members, to be quite unclear. 
 
A particularly important area of uncertainty is whether amendments engage financial privilege 
regardless of the amount of money involved. We understand that the Commons clerks do 
employ a “de minimis” threshold, on which basis amendments with insignificant financial 
implications are not judged to engage financial privilege. The internal guide used by 
parliamentary counsel refers to a threshold and confirms that one amendment to the Welfare 
Reform Bill in 2012 was determined to have not engaged financial privilege “on the basis that the 
cost which it involved would be absorbed within the normal costs of the Department” (see 
Appendix 2). However, we have found it impossible to establish what this threshold is and how 
consistently it is applied. A senior Commons clerk told us that the de minimis threshold is 
usually taken to be around £250,000 when deciding whether a bill requires a money resolution, 
but that there is no equivalent recognised figure for determining whether a Lords amendment 
engages financial privilege. Another senior official closely involved in the process told us: 
“looking back over a career I can’t say that I can regard it as ever having been applied in a way 
that I could tell you what the rule is”. 
 
Some fear that writing such rules down would risk further bureaucratising the process in an 
unhelpful way. Yet the lack of clear rules undoubtedly makes it difficult for many people to 
understand how financial privilege works. One peer told us that he would “welcome the 
publication of some clear guidance of the criteria that they apply […] not least because we all try 
to comply, and if we know what the rules are it makes it a bit easier for us”. The lack of clear 
rules is problematic not only with respect to parliamentarians, but even more so for those 
outside who seek to engage with the parliamentary process. There is a real danger that the lack of 
transparent rules may feed wider perceptions of abuse, and erode trust in parliament. 
 
Complaint 3: Financial privilege is being interpreted increasingly broadly  
Complaint 
The third complaint is again clearly related. That is, that the principle of financial privilege is 
being interpreted inconsistently, and that its application may be broadening over time. For 
example in debate on the Labour government’s Pensions Bill, Conservative frontbencher Lord 
Hunt of Wirral suggested that “It is curious that suddenly privilege is invoked. The Minister 
owes us some further explanation … the House has debated these subjects on many previous 
occasions” (HL Deb 24 Jul 2007, c700). For so long as the rules about what counts as financial 
privilege remain unclear, such allegations are likely.  
 
Assessment 
In his 2009 briefing, Michael Pownall, then Clerk of the Parliaments, acknowledged that “it is 
difficult to say whether the use of privilege reasons is increasing or whether they are being 
applied to amendments which would not previously have attracted a claim of privilege” (in 
Constitution Committee, 2011: 10). It is beyond the capacity of our research to answer this 
question conclusively: to do so would require not only analysis of amendments on which 
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financial privilege was invoked, but also of the many more on which it was not, and ideally to 
look at a longer time period. Instead, we draw some more limited conclusions based on the data 
that we have collected. 
 
We have discovered a number of surprising cases of amendments on which financial privilege 
was invoked. These include amendments: 
 to require the government to publish guidance on how individuals could request information 
about any data held on them about their fingerprints or other samples, and to request its 
destruction (Lords amendment 2 to the Counter-Terrorism Bill, 2007-08); 
 to require that certain regulations about matters involving spending be subject to the 
affirmative procedure in the Commons in some circumstances (Lords amendment 173 to the 
Criminal Justice and Immigration Bill, 2007-08); 
 to require a delay of 60 days between certain regulations about matters with financial 
implications being laid and being approved, during which time either House may debate 
them and refer them to a select committee for a report (Lords amendment 160 to the 
Planning Bill, 2007-08); 
 to delay the commencement of a bill that had financial implications (Lords amendment 1 to 
the Personal Care at Home Bill, 2009-10); 
 to delay the implementation of a bill that had financial implications until after the publication 
of an independent report into its affordability (Lords amendment 3 to the Personal Care at 
Home Bill, 2009-10); and 
 to add a sunset provision to a bill that had financial implications (Lords amendment 4 to the 
Personal Care at Home Bill, 2009-10). 
 
Part of the difficulty with such amendments is that the clerks may judge legitimately that they 
have financial implications, but it may not have been the primary intent of the mover and 
supporters of the amendment to challenge the financial implications themselves. If peers feel 
genuinely that a policy requires greater consultation or parliamentary oversight, it may be galling 
to see financial privilege invoked on their amendments simply because the policy in question 
involves money. Yet it would be difficult for the clerks to be expected take into account the 
primary intent of an amendment – if they did, amendments introducing delay could indeed be 
used as a “stalking horse” to prevent future spending, or spending cuts. Where the line is drawn 
between procedural amendments and those whose primary purpose is to affect spending is one 
of the difficult questions about financial privilege. It is thus of particular interest to see whether 
such lines have been drawn consistently. 
 
In some of the cases cited above, we have been able to find earlier, seemingly parallel, 
amendments that were not judged to have engaged financial privilege. For example, while 
financial privilege was invoked against amendment 173 to the Criminal Justice and Immigration 
Bill in 2008, it was not judged to have been engaged on Lords amendment 87 to the Social 
Security Bill (1997-98), which also made regulations affirmative. The regulations in question 
included those that enabled the abolition of the lone parent rate of Child Benefit, which was 
estimated by the government to save £45 million over its first three financial years (HC Deb 4 
Dec 1997, c328W). Neither was financial privilege considered to have been engaged on Lords 
amendments 3-5 to the Education (Student Loans) Bill (1989-90), which made regulations 
affirmative including those that set the maximum value of student loans. 
 
Likewise, while financial privilege was invoked in 2010 against Lords amendment 4 to the 
Personal Care at Home Bill, it was not judged to have been engaged on Lords amendment 47 to 
the Community Care (Delayed Discharges, etc.) Bill (2002-03), which introduced a sunset clause 
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on a part of the bill that involved significant spending. Nor was financial privilege considered to 
have been engaged on Lords amendment 4 to the Football (Disorder) Bill (1999-2000). This 
amendment brought forward the sunset provision that was already specified in the bill, and the 
bill itself involved sufficient spending to have required a money resolution – though the sums 
involved were undoubtedly lower than those for the Personal Care at Home Bill. 
 
Although we have not examined the period prior to 1974 in any detail, we have found one case 
from 1931 that appears to indicate a significantly different practice. During the passage of the 
Agricultural Land (Utilisation) Bill (1930-31) the Lords passed a package of amendments to 
delete the establishment and funding of the Agricultural Land Corporation. The Commons 
disagreed to the amendments, but did not give a financial privilege Reason. The Lords 
subsequently insisted on its amendments, citing in its own Reason to the Commons that the 
proposal “involve[d] an expenditure which is unjustifiable in the present financial situation”.24 
Such amendments would today almost certainly have been designated as engaging financial 
privilege. 
 
All we can conclude from these examples is that financial privilege has been applied 
inconsistently. But they do raise the possibility that the definition of what is covered by financial 
privilege may have expanded over time. If questions of what engages financial privilege and what 
does not are indeed based on precedent, any move to include amendments of a given type within 
its remit is likely to be repeated once the principle has been accepted by the Clerk of Legislation. 
The parliamentary counsel guide (see Appendix 2) notes that amendments of certain kinds 
“have” been ruled as engaging financial privilege in the past. This is of course a government 
document, not a publication of the House of Commons (or indeed the House of Lords), but 
seems to indicate that the government keeps precedent under review. Any risk of “creep” thus 
seems particularly real if the government plays any role in the designation of amendments, which 
is a question that we return to with respect to complaint 7 below. 
 
Complaint 4: No explanation is given for why financial privilege applies 
Complaint 
A fourth and again connected complaint is that, once an amendment has been returned to the 
Lords with a financial privilege Reason, no explanation is given as to why it had been judged to 
engage financial privilege. This complaint was voiced, for example, in November 2008 in relation 
to the Counter-Terrorism Bill. Conservative peer Baroness Hanham complained that it was 
“unsatisfactory, even more so when the reasons for the financial privilege are not really spelt out 
to us. The [minister] has just sat down without giving any reason from the other place as to what 
lies behind privilege being put on the amendment” (HL Deb 24 Nov 2008, c1294). The 
following day on the Planning Bill, Liberal Democrat peer Baroness Hamwee commented that 
“it is easy for a Minister to assert in another place that there are financial implications, and for 
that to be accepted there without discussion and argument as to whether that is really so” (HL 
Deb 25 Nov 2008, c1360). 
 
This complaint has been repeated more recently. With respect to the Welfare Reform Bill in 
2012, Liberal Democrat peer Lord Alderdice suggested that the Commons “could perhaps be a 
little more forthcoming as to precisely why it feels that it is important to exercise privilege” (HL 
Deb 2 Feb 2012, c1675). When a financial privilege Reason was later given for rejecting his 
amendment to the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill, Crossbench peer 
Lord Pannick commented: “I doubt that I am the only noble Lord who finds it very regrettable 
that this House should be told that financial privilege controversially applies to an amendment 
but noble Lords are not told why that is so” (HL Deb 23 Apr 2012, c1561). 
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Assessment 
It is certainly true that the Commons does not explain why financial privilege is judged to apply 
to an amendment. When financial privilege was invoked against his amendment to the Legal Aid, 
Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill, Lord Pannick approached the Commons 
authorities to request such an explanation. He received an email reply stating that he could not 
be given a “reasoned response” because “[d]esignation of financial privilege constitutes 
procedural advice from the Clerk of Legislation to the Chair and as such is confidential”. In 
interview he thus suggested that, 
 
if they weren’t parliament – if they were some other public authority – the courts, by way of judicial 
review, would tell them that it is elementary that public law requires those basic criteria to be 
satisfied: you must tell people what standards you are applying, and you must give a reason for 
your decision. 
 
Parliament is clearly governed by different rules to other public authorities. But particularly when 
combined with the lack of clear rules, the failure to provide any written explanation risks 
reducing clarity, as well as undermining legitimacy and accountability. In most cases, only a short 
statement would be necessary, explaining how the decision that the amendment engaged 
financial privilege was arrived at. While the role of the Clerk of Legislation is properly behind the 
scenes, and it may be understandable for advice to the Speaker to remain confidential, 
accountability could nonetheless be provided more openly by the Speaker himself. This might 
include statements on the floor of the Commons chamber. Of course, if the definitions were 
clarified, the presentation of such statements would become much less onerous. 
 
Complaint 5: The privilege Reason doesn’t reflect why the amendment was 
rejected  
Complaint 
Whenever it disagrees with a Lords amendment, the Commons sends a formal “Reason” to the 
Lords to explain why. If the amendment was judged by the clerks to have engaged financial 
privilege, the Reason always cites only financial privilege rather than the Commons’ substantive 
policy objection. This means that the substantive reason for rejecting the amendment is lost 
from the formal message communicated to the Lords. According to the briefing note from the 
Commons clerks, “[t]his is because giving another reason [would suggest] either that the 
Commons haven’t noticed the financial implications, or that they are somehow not attaching 
importance to their financial primacy” (Rogers and Sharpe, 2012a). 
 
Occasionally, this practice has caused problems. On the Social Security Amendment Bill in 1974, 
Lord Aberdare (Conservative) complained that the use of a financial privilege Reason had left 
peers without any way of telling “whether our point of view has been considered at all” because 
the Commons had debated the amendments late the previous night and Hansard had not yet 
been printed (HL Deb 12 Dec 1974, c782). Commenting on the financial privilege Reason given 
for disagreeing with an amendment to the School Standards and Framework Bill in 1998, 
Baroness Blatch (also Conservative) claimed that “there is an arrogance about producing that 
and no other reason” (HL Deb 21 Jul 1998, cc736-37).  
 
Assessment 
We have not found compelling evidence that the loss of a substantive Reason where financial 
privilege is involved is a significant problem. Reasons were originally developed in the era before 
Hansard, as a way of facilitating communication between the two Houses. With the advent of 
better forms of communication – including Hansard and, more recently, televised proceedings – 
Reasons have become more of a formality, and tend to be quite brief and imprecise. In fact, it is 
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arguable that the only useful purpose of Reasons today is to signal to the Lords that the 
Commons has invoked financial privilege on an amendment. 
 
It has been suggested that, where financial privilege is invoked, the Commons might give a dual 
Reason that also specifies the substantive policy justification. This appears to have been the 
practice in the past, when Reasons were far more detailed.25 The idea was for example 
highlighted by Conservative Lord Jenkin of Roding in a Lords debate on the Business Rate 
Supplements Bill in 2009 (HL Deb 29 Jun 2009, c29). But such a change would do little to 
improve clarity. The bigger question is whether there is any purpose served by Reasons – and the 
House of Commons Reasons Committee – at all. This question was briefly considered by the 
House of Commons Modernisation Committee a few years ago, as part of a general review of 
the legislative process. In terms of the usefulness of Reasons to MPs, the committee noted that 
“[i]t is possible, even likely, that even Members who have followed the debate closely are entirely 
unaware of what the reasons are” (Modernisation Committee, 2006: 39). Despite receiving some 
evidence in favour of the abolition of Reasons, the committee came down against an immediate 
change. We return to this question in the recommendations section of the report. 
 
Complaint 6: Decisions on financial privilege exclude MPs as well as peers 
Complaint 
Financial privilege is primarily intended to protect the rights of the elected House of Commons 
in the face of amendments from the unelected House of Lords. But MPs actually have little 
engagement with the process. When Lords amendments are debated, and the Speaker has 
indicated that financial privilege is engaged, it is striking that MPs rarely mention this when they 
speak. If the Commons gives serious consideration to the amendments they tend to focus 
instead on the substantive policy merits (thus linked to complaint 5).  
 
In most cases, Lords amendments sent to the Commons fall within the money resolution or 
ways and means resolution agreed by the Commons, which authorise expenditure and taxation 
respectively. Occasionally, however, the Lords has passed amendments that were not authorised 
by the relevant resolution (either because they apply to a bill for which there is no such 
resolution, or where the terms specified in the resolution do not cover the charge proposed). If 
such a resolution is not made by the time the amendments come to be debated by the 
Commons, they are considered to represent an “intolerable breach” of the Commons’ financial 
privileges and are ruled out of order by the Speaker.26 Consequently they are not even debated by 
the Commons. Such amendments are sometimes referred to as involving “unwaivable privilege”. 
On rare occasions when this has occurred, the Commons’ failure to debate such amendments 
has provoked criticism from peers. When an amendment to the Films Bill was ruled out of order 
by the Commons in 1985, Labour peer Lord Jenkins of Putney complained that “[i]t seems to 
me unreasonable that the proposition should be thrown out in principle without consideration” 
(HL Deb 13 May 1985, c961).  
 
Assessment 
On the broad point of MP involvement, it does seem quite strange that these decisions are taken 
behind the scenes by Commons clerks with little input, or even interest, from members. This 
situation must result in part from the lack of explanation offered for why exactly financial 
privilege is judged to have been engaged. If this were spelt out more clearly, supporters of Lords 
amendments in the Commons (in particular the opposition frontbench) could monitor the 
application of financial privilege more closely. Instead they are largely kept in the dark. If MPs 
themselves are not interested in protecting their financial privileges, this might be seen as 
weakening the case for using the procedure to constrain the Lords. But equally, there are few 
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complaints from MPs about current procedures. Nonetheless there are vulnerabilities in terms of 
lack of accountability to the Commons, discussed further under complaint 7 below.  
 
With respect to unwaivable privilege, the first thing to note is that it applies relatively rarely. 
Over the period 1974-2013 we have found only 15 amendments, proposed to eight bills, that 
were ruled out of order on this basis. This occurred most recently in 2010, on the amendment 
previously referred to on the Identity Documents Bill.27 According to the Lords Companion, it is 
“unprofitable” for such amendments to be tabled in the Lords “[u]nless there is reason to believe 
that the necessary supplementary financial resolution will be made by the Commons” (House of 
Lords, 2013: 164) – i.e. that the government will support the amendment. Consequently, the 
Lords clerks will now usually advise non-government peers not to table such amendments. 
Notably this same kind of warning is not routinely given by Lords clerks in the case of more 
standard “waivable” privilege. 
 
While it might seem odd that the Commons’ primacy ends up restricting the power of MPs to 
debate Lords amendments, this treatment can be seen as justified on the basis that a similar 
amendment proposed by an MP would have been ruled out of order (a facility that does not 
apply to Lords amendments, given the weaker powers of the Lord Speaker). It would be odd if 
the Lords were less constrained than the Commons in its proposal of such amendments. In fact, 
there is still a route for MPs to debate such amendments, but this depends on the government 
moving the necessary resolution (which only a minister can do). This does not necessarily require 
the government to support the amendments, though ministers are likely to facilitate such a 
debate only in unusual circumstances.28  
 
Complaint 7: Financial privilege is controlled by government for political ends 
Complaint 
A widespread perception underlying much of the criticism about financial privilege is that it is 
controlled by the government and used for largely political ends. This complaint is particularly 
common, and thus important. The pages of Hansard record many such claims from peers of all 
parties, and also from MPs: “the Government chose to claim privilege” (HL Deb 22 Jul 1996, 
c1223), “the Government’s claim to financial privilege is simply misplaced” (HL Deb 21 Jul 
1998, c738), “the Government have now made it the subject of the privilege amendment” (HL 
Deb 7 May 2008, c591), “the Government are trying to invoke financial privilege” (HC Deb 1 
Feb 2012, c879), “[it] is therefore unclear how on earth the Government can claim financial 
privilege” (HC Deb 17 Apr 2012, c205). When financial privilege was invoked against 
amendments to the Welfare Reform Bill, Labour backbencher Lord Hughes of Woodside 
suggested that “[i]t is hard to believe there was not a nudge and a wink from the Government to 
try to save their own blushes” (HL Deb 1 Feb 2012, c1571). One outside group told us: 
 
it does just seem unfair that you can have an issue that keeps ping ponging and it isn’t resolved 
because the government haven’t addressed the key concerns, which mean they can’t get parliament to 
support them, but they can just override that by claiming financial privilege. 
 
In the particular case of the Welfare Reform Bill, this perception was arguably reinforced by 
ministers during the Commons debate on Lords amendments. Both Chris Grayling and Maria 
Miller (then ministers at the Department for Work and Pensions) stated that they would “ask the 
Reasons Committee to ascribe financial privilege as the reason” for disagreeing to the 
amendments (HC Deb 1 Feb 2012, cc826, 871, 907). During the same debate, Iain Duncan 
Smith, the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, likewise commented that the opposition 
was “upset that we are invoking financial privilege” (HC Deb 1 Feb 2012, c877). 
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Assessment 
In order to assess this important complaint, it is necessary to distinguish between two stages of 
the financial privilege process: designation and invocation. 
 
Once Lords amendments have been received by the Commons, we have already seen that the 
first stage is to identify whether any of them engage financial privilege. This process of 
designation is a politically impartial one conducted by the clerks, on behalf of the Speaker. It 
does not directly involve government ministers in any way. However, the Commons clerks are 
not experts on how the government’s legislation is drafted or on how much it would cost to 
fund individual provisions. For practical reasons the government therefore does often have some 
input at the designation stage. This appeared to be confirmed in 2012 by Lord Strathclyde, then 
Leader of the Lords, who said: “It is the Speaker who takes a view on the advice of the clerks. I 
would not be at all surprised if they had had a discussion with the Government, but there is 
nothing new in any of this” (HL Deb 1 Feb 2012, c1568). In fact, as we have seen, the Speaker 
in practice generally plays no part in this decision. 
 
The key link for the clerks is with parliamentary counsel, the group of government lawyers who 
draft all government legislation. They provide background advice about the financial and legal 
effects of bills, which may be help the Commons clerks make judgements on various procedural 
matters, including grouping of amendments, whether amendments are within the bill’s scope, 
and whether a financial resolution is required. According to their own internal guide on financial 
resolutions, another of parliamentary counsel’s responsibilities is to “[c]onsider the financial 
implications of any amendments in the House of Lords” (Parliamentary Counsel, 2013: 2). 
Daniel Greenberg, formerly a senior member of parliamentary counsel, has described counsel’s 
relationship with the parliamentary authorities as having “traditionally been one of strong mutual 
support, and of considerable mutual confidence” (2011: 89). 
 
Our understanding is that it is routine for parliamentary counsel and the Commons clerks to be 
in contact over the designation of amendments. On the majority of occasions the process of 
adding a “P” beside Lords amendments of course relates to government amendments, where 
parliamentary counsel will be well qualified to comment – but where financial privilege will 
routinely be waived, making the judgement relatively unimportant. Indeed, a side issue is why so 
much energy goes into this process both by parliamentary counsel and Commons clerks when 
these amendments are liable to be accepted by the Commons en bloc, on ministers’ 
recommendation. 
 
With respect to Lords defeats, staff working for the government’s parliamentary business 
managers (e.g. whips) will be in close contact with officials in the department handling the bill, 
and/or parliamentary counsel, to raise with them any concerns. Parliamentary counsel can thus 
form a view early on as to whether a particular non-government amendment could be designated 
as engaging financial privilege. Counsel may then initiate contact with the Clerk of Legislation to 
ask their view, and sometimes argue on the government’s behalf that the rules ought to apply a 
particular way. On other occasions the Clerk of Legislation may actively seek out the view of 
parliamentary counsel, when he or she is unsure whether an amendment should be considered to 
engage financial privilege or not. During this process parliamentary counsel may refer the matter 
back to the government department for advice, for example where it is unclear how much 
money would be involved. Anecdotally, we have heard of one case where the minister 
(unsuccessfully) sought directly to influence a decision. It is impossible to know how common 
this is, but it seems likely to be rare. 
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None of this suggests that the government actually controls the designation of amendments. 
Ultimately it is for the Clerk of Legislation to make up his or her mind on the basis of all the 
arguments. One senior Commons official told us that the Clerk of Legislation is “not a soft 
touch” and would not take parliamentary counsel’s advice “uncritically”. This interviewee did 
acknowledge that parliamentary counsel usually argues “for” rather than against designation, and 
that they keep careful records – thus being in a strong position to cite past precedents to 
strengthen the government’s case. Another senior clerk commented that in dealing with 
parliamentary counsel it is advisable to “watch them like hawks”. 
 
This raises several potential problems. First the concern of “creep”, highlighted above, given that 
in borderline cases government lawyers appear to be more likely to push for the amendments to 
be covered by financial privilege rather than not. Second, it is striking that both parties to these 
discussions have overlapping interests: the clerks are responsible for protecting the privileges of 
the Commons, while the government wishes to secure the passage of its legislation. There is thus 
a potential imbalance of power, because those representing the interests of the Lords, and of 
supporters of non-government amendments, are largely excluded from these discussions. This is 
exacerbated by the lack of transparency, which also means that there is little political cover for 
these decisions. The Speaker clearly has the political authority to speak for MPs collectively, and 
is answerable to them, and yet provides little accountability for these behind-the-scenes 
decisions. The current system hence leaves Commons clerks potentially vulnerable to accusations 
that they are too close to parliamentary counsel, with little opportunity to answer back. If the 
Speaker were more actively involved, and particularly if clearer definitions/explanations of why 
amendments engage financial privilege were available, accountability would be greatly improved, 
at least in the Commons. 
 
Once an amendment has been judged to engage financial privilege, MPs must decide how to 
respond. If the Commons accepts the amendments, financial privilege is waived; if it disagrees, 
privilege is invoked; and if it proposes an alternative, privilege does not arise. In the vast majority 
of cases it is in effect the government’s attitude to the amendments that drives the decision, as its 
recommendation to the Commons is almost invariably accepted. Hence at this stage the 
government wields considerable power, but only through its Commons majority. Once the 
Commons has taken the decision (which as noted above is generally done on the substantive 
policy merits, with financial privilege rarely mentioned) the Reasons Committee will meet if any 
Lords amendments have been rejected. This committee has a government majority, and the 
Reasons are moved by the minister – having been drafted in advance by parliamentary counsel. 
In practice whenever the Commons disagrees an amendment on which financial privilege was 
engaged the financial privilege Reason is given – meaning financial privilege is invoked. Thus 
although the ministers on the Welfare Reform Bill were strictly correct in claiming that they 
would ask the Reasons Committee to give a financial privilege Reason, this made the scale of the 
government’s initiative sound bigger than it really was. Such comments arguably inflamed 
tensions on this bill in an unhelpful way. 
 
With respect to the invoking of financial privilege, we can see that the government could almost 
always avoid this if it wished, but only by inviting the Commons either to accept the amendment 
or agree an alternative proposal (e.g. an amendment in lieu). One former senior minister told us: 
“I remember in government being in meetings talking about financial privilege where, […] 
notwithstanding advice from the clerks, there was clearly a political decision to be taken as to 
whether or not one should place financial privilege on an amendment”. This suggests that 
ministers may at times have sought to avoid arguments about financial privilege by proposing 
slightly altered wording to the original bill, to avoid invocation. 
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Complaint 8: Financial privilege weakens the Lords’ capacity to scrutinise 
legislation 
Complaint 
Central to most complaints about financial privilege is that it restricts the Lords’ capacity to 
scrutinise legislation. Responding to the Commons’ recent invocation of financial privilege on 
the Public Service Pensions Bill, Labour peer Lord Whitty warned that “this House has some 
serious thinking to do about how seriously our amendments and our scrutiny are taken” (HL 
Deb 23 Apr 2013, c1360). These kinds of concerns are not restricted to the Lords, but have also 
been expressed in the Commons. Thus during a debate on a Labour government Planning Bill, 
Liberal Democrat MP Julia Goldsworthy suggested that “[a]lmost all the substantial 
improvements made to the Bill are the result of pressure in the other place. It seems 
inappropriate to exclude the Lords from the process of putting flesh on the bones of this 
legislation” (HC Deb 24 Nov 2008, c553). 
 
This complaint was particularly prominent in relation to the Welfare Reform Bill in 2012. 
Reflecting on that bill, one Labour peer told us that: 
 
The bigger worry was [that] there’s a lot of social policy that has a budgetary consequence, and if in 
the end we could be prevented from getting into a whole swathe of social policy that traditionally the 
Lords has always talked about, because there might be a spending implication, [it] felt 
fundamentally and constitutionally wrong. 
 
One charity that campaigned on the bill told us that the use of financial privilege felt like “an 
amazing way of curtailing the proper interplay” and “seemed a sort of procedural way of 
curtailing debate”. Another group suggested that “the fact that all those amendments could just 
be overturned on a finance provision does make me question whether that process is working”. 
Whether or not these views are justified, it is clear that the use of financial privilege risked 
undermining the legitimacy of the parliamentary process among some of those seeking to engage 
with it. 
 
Assessment 
The extent to which the formal conventions surrounding financial privilege do in fact limit the 
Lords’ capacity to scrutinise is debatable. Even if convention requires that the Lords may not 
insist on its original amendment, it may nonetheless propose alternative amendments. While this 
certainly limits the Lords’ options, it is not dissimilar from how the two Houses behave in order 
to formally avoid “double insistence” during extended rounds of ping pong (Erskine May, 24th 
edn., 2011: 636). Referring to the Welfare Reform Bill, one Labour peer described financial 
privilege to us as “more of an irritant than a serious problem” because “instead of going over the 
hurdle you just go round it really if you can”, by proposing a new amendment. 
 
Yet financial privilege probably does limit the Lords’ willingness to challenge the government in 
practice, not least due to poor understanding. Many peers have almost certainly not realised that 
they may legitimately agree amendments in lieu. They also generally wish to respect the 
Commons’ privileges. One told us that a financial privilege Reason “may suggest to some 
members of the House of Lords that they should vote it down on that ground alone, and if 
you’re coming to ping pong a few votes may matter”. Indeed, if it did not dampen peers’ 
willingness to press a proposal, financial privilege would serve no useful purpose at all. 
 
Hence, this complaint is really only supported insofar as peers have failed to understand their 
relative freedom in how to respond. Greater transparency would again help to make this clear. 
The far bigger question of how much the Lords, as an unelected chamber, should be constrained 
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in what it can do is ultimately a political rather than a procedural one. It is a question which has 
become increasingly salient as the post-1999 House of Lords has become more assertive in its 
actions, and a wider range of people (including outside groups) have come to believe that it has a 
valid role as an amending chamber.  
 
Complaint 9: Financial privilege is being invoked more often than it was in the 
past 
Complaint 
The final complaint is that financial privilege is being invoked more often than it was in the past. 
This claim has been particularly prominent in the period under coalition government. Speaking 
in debate on the Identity Documents Bill, Labour peers referred to the use of financial privilege 
as “one more noxious constitutional innovation on the part of the coalition” (Lord Howarth of 
Newport, HL Deb 21 Dec 2010, c1003), claiming that the Conservative government of the 
1980s and 1990s “never cried financial privilege” (Lord Sewel, HL Deb 21 Dec 2010, c1009). In 
2012 Labour peer Lord Morgan likewise claimed that the application of financial privilege on the 
Welfare Reform Bill “adds a new and unwelcome principle to our unfortunately unwritten 
constitution” (HL Deb 14 Feb 2012, c687). Similar complaints were also expressed outside 
parliament with respect to the Welfare Reform Bill. Writing for Public Finance, the deputy director 
of Demos, Claudia Wood, claimed that “[f]inancial privilege has been used increasingly in recent 
years”.29 A news release by the charity 4Children stated that it was “virtually unprecedented that 
‘financial privilege’ be used in this way to prevent proper democratic oversight of the law”.30 The 
Huffington Post website likewise reported comments by an unnamed senior Labour figure that the 
move “went far beyond any tactics used by the Thatcher government”.31 
 
Assessment 
As established in this report, financial privilege on Lords amendments is not a recent innovation, 
but rests on principles that are centuries old. It is unclear when financial privilege on Lords 
amendments emerged in its current form, but the Commons was certainly sending financial 
privilege Reasons by the early nineteenth century.32 By 1930 the Lords’ insistence on 
amendments that the Commons had rejected with a financial privilege Reason provoked anger 
from the then prime minister, Ramsay MacDonald, who argued that this was contrary to 
convention (HC Deb 4 Feb 1930, cc1849-53). 
 
As we demonstrated above (Table 3, p. 17), financial privilege has not been invoked greatly more 
often in the 2010-13 period than in other parliaments since 1974. However, we did note that a 
higher proportion of Lords defeats than usual were responded to with financial privilege – though 
the overall numbers are relatively small. This has almost certainly fed perceptions of abuse. 
Leaving aside the question of “creep” in the definition of what is covered by financial privilege 
(see complaint 3), one possible explanation is that the Commons was more likely to respond to 
Lords defeats that engaged financial privilege by disagreeing them (and thus invoking privilege) 
than in the past. 
 
To assess this, it is necessary to look not only at the occasions on which financial privilege was 
invoked, but also at all of the other Lords defeats on which it was engaged. Since 1974 the 
government has been defeated almost 1200 times in the Lords, and it is beyond our capacity to 
analyse all of these defeats. We thus sampled three parliamentary sessions: 2001-02, 2005-06 and 
2010-12. These were the first sessions of each full parliament since the Lords was reformed in 
1999, making them broadly comparable. We recorded every defeat, and then excluded defeats 
that were not relevant (e.g. because they were on non-legislative matters).33 Each of the 
remaining amendments was traced through the legislative process to determine (i) whether 
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financial privilege was engaged, and (ii) how the Commons responded.34 Where it was unclear 
from the official records whether privilege was engaged on an amendment, we asked the 
Commons clerks to provide this information from their archived records. This information is 
summarised in Table 4. 
 
As the table shows, there were roughly comparable numbers of relevant Lords defeats in each of 
the three sessions considered. Yet financial privilege was invoked on far more amendments in 
2010-12 than in the two earlier sessions. However, the primary reason for this was that in 2010-
12 a far larger proportion of relevant Lords defeats engaged financial privilege. There were only 
three such defeats in 2001-02 (7% of relevant defeats) and one in 2005-06 (2%), compared to 18 
in 2010-12 (46%). Of these 18 cases, 17 were responded to by the Commons invoking financial 
privilege. In previous sessions the figures are barely comparable, though financial privilege was 
also invoked on two of the three defeats on which it was engaged in 2001-02. 
  
Table 4: Lords defeats and application of financial privilege, 2001-02, 2005-06 and 2010-12 sessions 
  2001-02 2005-06 2010-12 
Total number of Lords defeats 56 62 48 
Relevant Lords defeats 45 44 39 
- on which financial privilege not engaged 42 43 21 
- on which financial privilege engaged 3 1 18 
 – and financial privilege invoked 2 0 17 
 – and financial privilege waived 0 0 0 
 – and an alternative proposed 1 1 1 
Source: UCL data on Lords government defeats, Journals of the House of Commons, and other 
parliamentary documents. 
 
The “creep” in the definition of financial privilege amendments hypothesised above could 
potentially account for some small amount of change over time. But the change in this period 
has been stark, and is therefore the product of bigger factors. The key change is almost certainly 
a result of the new policy battlegrounds between the government and the Lords in 2010-12, 
concerning the coalition’s austerity programme. The Labour opposition has used its base in the 
Lords to try and alter these policies; hence the changing political landscape has meant that Lords 
defeats are more likely than before to have financial implications. This implies that change has 
been largely political, not procedural. We expand on this wider political landscape towards the 
end of the report. 
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International comparisons 
As we have seen, the House of Commons’ financial primacy in the UK is long established, and 
has far reaching implications – extending beyond the claiming of financial privilege on individual 
Lords amendments. But it is important to note that such arrangements are far from unique to 
the UK. Indeed, it is very common in bicameral legislatures for the second chamber to have less 
power than the first over financial matters, and for financial bills or amendments to be singled 
out for special treatment. In this section we briefly review the arrangements for financial 
legislation in 20 other bicameral legislatures, then consider the treatment of amendments with 
financial implications in more detail in three case study countries influenced by Westminster: 
Ireland, Canada and Australia. 
 
Financial legislation in 20 other bicameral legislatures 
It would be far beyond our capacity to collect data on the treatment of amendments with 
financial implications in a large number of other countries: as we have seen, gathering this 
information even with respect to the UK is surprisingly difficult. But the extent to which second 
chambers’ powers on financial matters are limited is more readily demonstrated through looking 
at their powers on financial bills. In the UK, the Lords can delay most government bills by 
around a year, and has an absolute veto on government bills introduced in the Lords itself (for a 
discussion see Russell, 2013). But with respect to money bills the Lords has a maximum delaying 
power of just a month (while by convention such bills are given an expedited passage, and tend 
not to be amended at all). It is far easier to compare this kind of power between parliaments in 
different countries, as in most cases it is set down clearly in the constitution. Although being 
different to financial privilege per se, this gives some indication of the extent to which financial 
matters are treated as special in other bicameral legislatures. 
 
Table 5 summarises the powers of second chambers in 20 other democracies alongside the UK, 
in terms of ordinary legislation and financial bills – that is, broadly the equivalent of our “money 
bills”. In only seven cases are financial bills treated in the same way as other government 
legislation, while in most of the remainder the second chamber’s power is limited in some way. 
Minimally, it is common to require financial bills to be introduced in the lower house, and be 
considered there before passing to the upper house. This applies in the UK, but also in 10 of the 
20 other cases – including the US, where the Senate otherwise has largely equal powers to the 
House of Representatives. More substantively, second chambers often have less opportunity to 
delay financial legislation than ordinary bills, and some also have limited power to amend it. So in 
Ireland the second chamber has 90 days to consider most legislation, but only 21 days for 
financial bills. Likewise, in Japan the second chamber is given 60 days on most bills, but only 30 
days on financial legislation. Even the powerful elected Australian Senate cannot make 
amendments to financial legislation, as it can to other bills, but can only ‘request’ them of the 
lower house (as discussed below). These examples demonstrate the extent to which financial 
primacy is frequently associated with lower house power. 
 
But of course, the focus of this report is not financial legislation itself, but the power of the 
Lords to make changes to other bills that have financial implications. Here it is far more difficult 
to collect comparative information, as this requires a careful reading of other parliaments’ 
standing orders and discussion with country specialists about how these are interpreted in 
practice. We have chosen three countries from the 20 illustrated in the table – Ireland, Canada 
and Australia – for which to explore this question in greater detail. They illustrate a diversity of 
approaches, and indicate some possible lessons that might be imported into the UK. 
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Table 5: Treatment of ordinary and financial legislation in 21 bicameral parliaments 
 Ordinary legislation Financial legislation 
Australia Bills are introduced in either house. Upper house 
may amend or reject any legislation. 
Must be introduced in lower house. Upper house 
may not amend but may ‘request’ amendments, 
or reject. 
Austria Bills are introduced in lower house. Upper house 
can object within eight weeks, but cannot amend. 
Upper house cannot object to federal budget. 
Belgium Two kinds of bills: ‘ordinary’ start in lower house 
and pass automatically unless 15 Senators dem-
and review within 15 days (upper house then can 
consider for 60 days); ‘bicameral’ bills, on e.g. 
foreign affairs, need support of both chambers. 
N/a 
 
 
Canada Bills are introduced in either house. Upper house 
may amend or reject any legislation. 
Must be introduced in lower house. Upper house 
may amend but not increase costs. 
Czech 
Republic 
Bills are introduced in lower house. Upper house 
has 30 days to review. 
N/a 
France Bills are introduced in either house. Upper house 
has right to amend or veto any legislation. 
Must be introduced in lower house. Upper house 
may have as few as 15 days to consider it. 
Germany  Upper house sees and comments on all 
legislation before introduction in lower house. 
After lower house reading bills return to upper 
house for approval. 
Treated as ordinary legislation, except budget 
which is introduced in both houses 
simultaneously. 
India Bills are introduced in either house. Reviewing 
house has six months. 
Most such bills must be introduced in the lower 
house, but budget is introduced in both houses 
simultaneously and upper house has 14 days to 
review (lower house is decisive). 
Ireland Bills are introduced in either house. Upper house 
has 90 days to consider bills passed by lower 
house. 
Must be introduced in lower house. Upper house 
has 21 days to review. Can ‘suggest’ amen-
dments, but lower house may ignore. 
Italy Both houses have equal powers to introduce, 
amend, and reject legislation. 
N/a 
Japan Bills are introduced in either house. Upper house 
has 60 days to review legislation. 
Must be introduced in lower house. Upper house 
has 30 days to review, lower house has last word. 
Mexico Bills are introduced in either house. Both houses 
may amend or reject legislation. 
Must be introduced in lower house. Lower house 
has last word on spending and upper house on 
tax. 
Netherlands Bills are introduced in lower house. Upper house 
can reject, but not amend, bills. 
N/a 
Poland Bills are introduced in lower house. Upper house 
has 30 days to review legislation. 
N/a 
Russia Bills are introduced in lower house. Upper house 
cannot amend bills but may reject within 14 days. 
N/a 
South Africa Bills are introduced in either house.  Must be introduced in lower house, but 
otherwise treated as ordinary legislation. 
Spain Bills are introduced in lower house. Upper house 
has two months to review, or 20 days in case of 
urgency. 
N/a 
Switzerland Bills are introduced in either house. Both houses 
have veto power over legislation. 
N/a 
UK Bills are introduced in either house. Upper house 
may amend or reject legislation.  
“Money bills” must be introduced in lower 
house. Upper house may only delay for one 
month. 
USA Bills are introduced in either house. Senate can 
amend or reject any legislation. 
Must be introduced in lower house, but 
otherwise treated as ordinary legislation. 
Source: Russell (2000: 34-38). “N/a” indicates that financial legislation is treated equally to other bills. 
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Ireland  
The bicameral Irish parliament, the Oireachtas, comprises Dáil Éireann (the lower chamber) and 
Seanad Éireann (the upper chamber). As in the UK, there are special rules surrounding “money 
bills”, defined as those that contain only financial provisions (as set out in Articles 21 and 22 of 
the Irish constitution). Money bills may only originate in the Dáil and cannot be amended by the 
Seanad, although the latter may make non-binding recommendations. For all other bills, standing 
orders in both chambers prohibit non-government members from moving amendments that 
“could have the effect of imposing or increasing” taxation or public spending.35 Were a non-
government member to table such an amendment, it would be ruled out of order by the 
presiding officer of the relevant chamber. But with the exception of money bills, which may not 
be amended at all by the Seanad, there are no restrictions at all on government ministers 
proposing financial amendments in either chamber. There is no concept comparable to that at 
Westminster of the Dáil invoking or waiving its financial primacy on such Seanad amendments. 
 
In some respects, the procedure in Ireland is clearly more restrictive than at Westminster, where 
any peer or MP may in practice freely table amendments with financial implications, provided 
that the bill in question has the necessary financial resolution. But unlike at Westminster, the 
restrictions in Ireland only apply to the imposition or increase in such charges: there are no 
comparable restrictions on amendments that would reduce taxation or spending, or modify 
legislative oversight of such provisions. In this respect, Ireland’s treatment of Seanad 
amendments with financial implications is less restrictive than that in the UK. 
 
Canada 
The Canadian parliament comprises the House of Commons (lower chamber) and the Senate 
(upper chamber). In practice, the Commons has primacy in relation to financial legislation, a 
principle that can be traced back to the practices of the Westminster parliament including the 
resolution of 1678 (O’Brien and Bosc, 2009: 823). In accordance with section 53 of the 
Constitution Act 1867, all legislation that imposes taxation or public spending must originate in 
the Commons. Section 54 states that the Commons may not agree to any spending unless this is 
supported by a “royal recommendation” from the Governor General (who acts on behalf of the 
monarch).36 Essentially this means having government support. 
 
These constitutional principles extend to individual legislative amendments (O’Brien and Bosc, 
2009: 833). Consequently, the Senate may not make amendments that would increase taxation or 
spending. A helpful discussion paper by John Mark Keyes – at the time Senior Counsel in the 
Legislation Section of the Canadian Department of Justice – outlines the circumstances in which 
an amendment requires a royal recommendation. In his view, the test is whether the amendment 
“would result in an increased charge in relation to the existing legislation, rather than the bill as 
introduced” (Keyes, 1997: 19). This leads him to conclude that, for a bill that reduced public 
spending, a royal recommendation would not be required for an amendment that restored some 
or all of this spending. Notably he indicates that a royal recommendation would also not be 
required for any reduction or repeal of spending. 
 
Although the Senate may not make amendments that would increase taxation or spending, there 
is disagreement between the two chambers on its right to make amendments with other financial 
implications. The Commons’ position is that the Senate should not amend financial provisions at 
all. In contrast, the opinion of the Senate is that this restriction applies only to increases in 
taxation or public spending, but it has asserted its right to make amendments resulting in 
reductions (Senate of Canada, 2013: 223-25). This disagreement is referred to in the official guide 
to the Commons’ practice and procedure, which states that “[m]ost of the disagreements 
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between the two Chambers arise over the extent of the Senate’s authority to amend financial 
legislation” (O’Brien and Bosc, 2009: 838). 
 
In the event that the Senate agrees to an amendment that the Commons considers to infringe its 
asserted financial privileges, the Commons has on occasion waived or invoked these (ibid.). This 
is done as part of the motion relating to the amendments that is agreed to on the floor of the 
Commons, and is subsequently communicated to the Senate in a message. For example, the 
following text is taken from a message agreed by the Commons in 1990 (the most recent 
occasion on which the Commons has sent the Senate a message insisting on its asserted financial 
privileges). It provides some explanation as to why the amendments were felt to infringe the 
financial privileges claimed by the Commons, notably including the amount of money involved: 
 
… this House considers that some of the aforementioned amendments, by altering the nature of the 
financial scheme proposed for the Unemployment Insurance system, do infringe the financial 
initiative of the Crown in a manner at variance with parliamentary practice respecting the Royal 
Recommendation … 
 
And considers, moreover, amendments 7 and 9, which would cause an increase to the budgetary 
deficit in the order of $1.75 billion annually and thus confound the Ways and Means as approved 
by this House, to be for that reason in violation of the principle embodied in Sections 53 and 54 of 
the Constitution Act, 1867, and constitutional practice, 
 
And, therefore, conscious in this of fellowship with its predecessors, reaffirms its sole and undoubted 
democratic right, which will not in this matter be waived, not only to grant aids and supplies to the 
Sovereign but to direct, limit, and appoint for all such grants their ends, purposes, considerations, 
conditions, limitations and qualifications, none of which are alterable by the Senate37 
 
Because the Commons invokes its privileges relatively infrequently, it is less clear whether there 
is a consensus on how the Senate may respond in such cases. Yet given the difference of opinion 
between the two chambers on such matters, it seems possible that the Senate could choose not 
to be bound by the Commons’ claim. 
 
As in Ireland, practice in Canada is in some respects more restrictive than in Westminster. The 
Senate cannot propose amendments to increase taxation or spending provisions, while non-
government MPs are limited by the requirement for a royal recommendation. Yet the Senate 
does not consider that it is restricted on amendments to reduce the amounts of taxation or 
spending. Unlike in Westminster, Canadian Commons’ messages to the Senate are agreed 
transparently on the floor of the House as part of a motion, and can provide some explanation 
for why financial rights were involved. 
 
Australia 
Of the three cases considered here, Australia is perhaps both the most well-documented and the 
most interesting, although it also shares some obvious features with Ireland and Canada. 
 
The Australian parliament comprises two directly elected chambers: the House of 
Representatives (lower chamber) and the Senate (upper chamber). The Senate is a powerful 
body. However, section 53 of the Australian constitution prevents “laws appropriating revenue 
or money, or imposing taxation” from starting in the Senate. In addition it states that the “Senate 
may not amend any proposed law so as to increase any proposed charge or burden on the 
people”, but it may nonetheless “request” such amendments. In terms of amendments, this 
oddly places non-government Senators in a stronger position than non-government MPs, since – 
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as in Canada – amendments involving additional spending require a message from the Governor 
General. This in practice will only be made available for amendments with government support 
– which can include those made in the House of Representatives in response to Senate requests. 
Australian House of Representatives Practice – the Australian equivalent of Erskine May – notes 
that with respect to the lower chamber: 
 
The assessment of whether amendments proposed by private Members would be in order can be 
difficult. At one extreme it may be argued that virtually any change in any bill will have some 
financial impact and, at the other extreme, it may be claimed that, unless an amendment explicitly 
and directly increases alters an appropriation, it may be moved by a private Member. 
(Wright and Fowler, 2012: 427) 
 
In terms of proposals from the Senate, the key question is whether a proposal can be sent in the 
form of an amendment or whether it must be put in the form of a “request”. Here similar 
arguments about the potential breadth of definitions apply (despite the difference in terms of 
outcomes being essentially procedural). There in fact are explicit disagreements between the 
chambers over interpretation. As House of Representatives Practice states, “the Senate may not 
amend any proposed law so as to increase any proposed charge or burden on the people. The 
precise meaning of this provision has not been conclusively determined, nor agreed between the 
Houses” (ibid: 451). The equivalent official document for the Senate notes that “[t]he 
constitutional innovation that became section 53 has been at the centre of disputes between the 
Senate and the executive (although technically the disagreement is between the two Houses) over 
the respective rights and powers of each” (Odgers, et al., 2012: 364). The Clerk of the Senate has 
suggested that requests should apply only in the case of proposals that “clearly, necessarily and 
directly” increase expenditure (ibid: 394). Notably, there is no restriction on amendments that 
reduce expenditure, or reinstate expenditure which a bill proposes to cut, in either chamber.38 
The official guide to Senate procedure does note that there are areas of uncertainty, for example 
“where it is not possible to determine the effect of an amendment on expenditure” (ibid: 396).  
 
An interesting aspect of procedure in Australia is that since a reform in 2000, proposals framed 
in the form of requests must “be accompanied by a statement of reasons for their being framed 
as requests together with a statement by the Clerk of the Senate on whether the amendments 
would be regarded as requests under the precedents of the Senate”, which “has provided the 
Senate with information about whether (and how) particular amendments attract any of the 
provisions of section 53” (ibid: 359). Hence how a proposal affects finance, and how it should be 
judged against the rules, is now very explicit. This is said to have reduced the number of 
disputes, both inside the Senate and between the chambers. A judgement is made on this matter 
in the Senate, by the Chairman of Committees on the advice of the Clerk.39 The latter will have 
discussed the question with the Office of Parliamentary Counsel, and generally there will be 
agreement but occasionally there is explicit disagreement. An example of an agreed statement 
was on Senate amendment 3 to the Crimes Legislation Amendments (Serious and Organised 
Crime) Bill (No. 2) 2009, that: 
 
The effect of this amendment is to extend the purposes in respect of which money may be debited 
from a special account. This may increase the amount that may be paid from the Confiscated 
Assets Account established by section 295 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, with those 
payments being made out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund under the standing appropriation in 
section 21 of the Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997. 
 
It is covered by section 53 because: 
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a) laws which cause money to be expended out of a standing appropriation are a charge or burden 
on the people (within the meaning of the third paragraph of section 53); and 
b) it is likely that the amendment will have the effect of increasing the amount that may be paid 
out of a standing appropriation and therefore of increasing such a proposed charge or burden, 
which is prevented by the third paragraph of section 53. 
 
In contrast with respect to the Tax Laws Amendment (Research and Development) Bill 2010, 
the Office of Parliamentary Counsel argued with respect to Senate amendment 8 that: 
 
The effect of this amendment is to allow the making of regulations that may increase the amount of 
expenditure payable out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund under the standing appropriation in 
section 16 of the Taxation Administration Act 1953. It is covered by section 53 because it may 
increase a “proposed charge or burden on the people”. 
 
However, the statement from the Clerk of the Senate concluded that: 
 
Amendment no. 8 would not be regarded as a request under the precedents of the Senate. The effect 
of amendment no. 8 is to provide the making of regulations which have the effect of changing the 
timing of the delivery of the research and development incentive to certain entities, through the 
introduction of quarterly tax credits. The Senate has long held the view that only a very direct effect 
on appropriation is regarded as an increase in charge or burden… [this proposal] does not meet 
the test of directness. 
 
The latter was reflected in the ruling from the Chairman of Committees in the Senate chamber, 
and subsequently accepted by the House of Representatives.40 These cases are of interest in the 
UK context both because of the clarity of reasoning, and the narrowness with which restrictions 
on the Senate are drawn. 
 
In fact, these arguments are of relatively little substantive importance, because in practice “the 
distinction between an amendment and a request is purely procedural” (Odgers, et al., 2012: 
345). Requests can be insisted upon by the Senate if they are refused by the House of 
Representatives. Despite the fact that “[t]here has been a difference of opinion as to the 
constitutionality of the action of the Senate in pressing requests. The House has never conceded 
the Senate’s power to do so” (Wright and Fowler, 2012: 457), this has occurred on various 
occasions – sometimes even resulting in the bill in question being dropped.41 
 
When there are differences of opinion between the two chambers on Senate amendments (but 
not requests), the House of Representatives sends formal Reasons. These used to be agreed in a 
Reasons Committee, but this was abolished by the House of Representatives as a modernisation 
measure in 1998. Reasons are now instead agreed on the floor of the chamber. 
 
The Australian experience reinforces some of the lessons from Ireland and Canada. In all three 
cases restrictions on amendments with financial implications apply only to those which increase 
expenditure, rather than those that reduce it or change its administration. Even more so than in 
Canada, the Australian system for defining which amendments fall on either side of the line has 
become increasingly explicit – with written statements both increasing transparency and thereby 
helping to reduce disputes. Australia has also reformed the procedure for the giving of Reasons. 
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The politics of financial privilege  
This report has demonstrated that there are significant misunderstandings about the current 
operation of financial privilege at Westminster. We have sought to clarify matters by providing a 
factual account of how financial privilege operates, backed up by a more complete set of 
statistics than has previously been published. Our report has considered in detail some of the 
main complaints levelled against the current process, and concluded that some – but not all – of 
them are supported by the facts. In particular, we conclude that there are some procedural 
problems with the operation of financial privilege, but the main driver of recent controversies 
has been political. The evidence on whether the application of financial privilege has changed over 
time is somewhat unclear; but what has definitely changed is the broader political environment. 
 
In the next section we consider options for the future, in terms of procedural and other 
organisational changes. We make some recommendations based both on existing UK practice, 
and on our examples from overseas. But before this we believe that it is important to consider 
the political context within which financial privilege operates, and how this has changed over 
time. 
 
To evaluate what should happen to arrangements for financial privilege, we need to first be clear 
on what the purpose of these arrangements actually is. The central principle of financial privilege 
is clearly that the Commons should control taxation and public expenditure. However, the 
reason why this might matter – and arguably even the extent to which it matters – has not been 
constant. Hence when the two resolutions in 1671 and 1678 formalised the Commons’ financial 
primacy, the problem facing MPs was that the Lords was too close to the executive. The 
resolutions asserted MPs’ rights, as the representatives of the people, against those of the 
executive and the Lords.  
 
In subsequent centuries the relationship between the two chambers substantially changed. 
Governments were increasingly drawn from the Commons, and became accountable to that 
chamber. In the years following 1832, as the franchise for the Commons widened, the 
entrenched class interests in the hereditary House of Lords became increasingly controversial. 
Various clashes eventually led to the 1911 Parliament Act, which cemented the Commons’ 
primacy on most legislation, and included specific provisions on money bills. By the mid-20th 
century, arguments about the rights of Lords and Commons were essentially about the right of a 
still largely hereditary, and Conservative-dominated, chamber against an elected one. The Lords 
clearly lacked legitimacy, and as a result tended to use its powers with caution (Shell, 1992; 1999), 
with various conventions to this effect building up. 
 
In 1999, things changed again. As documented at length elsewhere (Russell, 2010; 2013), 
Labour’s removal of the great majority of hereditary peers from the Lords had two important 
effects. First, it gave the chamber a greater sense of its own legitimacy, as all members had 
arrived by some kind of merit principle (either direct appointment, or election from among 
hereditary peers). Second, it removed the political imbalance, leaving a chamber where the two 
main parties were roughly equally matched, and the balance of power rested with the Liberal 
Democrats and independent Crossbenchers. These two key changes were mutually reinforcing: 
the new political balance (ironically reflecting voting patterns more accurately than the 
Commons) enhanced peers’ feelings of legitimacy further. The new party balance also made both 
Labour and Conservative governments potentially susceptible to Lords defeat. 
 
The number of defeats in the House of Lords over time is also well-documented, and was 
reproduced earlier in this report (see Table 3, p. 17). Under Labour post-1999 this number 
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sharply rose – which could be seen simply as a reversion to behaviour under the previous Labour 
government in the 1970s, but on closer inspection was more complex than that. As shown in 
Table 6, in the 1970s the Lords rarely challenged the House of Commons’ response to its 
defeats, but by the 1990s this behaviour had become commonplace. (N.b. the figures in the table 
indicate how many bills the Lords sent back following Commons’ disagreement with its 
amendments, so the number of amendments involved was far higher.) 
 
Table 6: Number of bills per parliament which the House of Lords has returned to the Commons 
following disagreement with its amendments, 1974-2012 
 Rounds of insistence*  
Parliament 1 2 3 4 Total 
1974-79 2 1 1 0 4 
1979-83 0 0 0 0 0 
1983-87 1 0 0 0 1 
1987-92 0 1 0 0 1 
1992-97 1 0 0 0 1 
1997-01 3 1 0 1 5 
2001-05 12 3 0 2 17 
2005-10 13 0 0 2 15 
2010-13** 6 0 0 0 6 
Total 38 6 1 5 50 
Source: Russell (2013), based largely on Joint Committee on Conventions (2006b). 
* Here “insistence” is interpreted broadly, as sending the bill back to the 
Commons after it has rejected Lords amendments. This includes the Lords 
agreeing a different amendment rather than insisting on its original wording. 
** Parliament incomplete. 
 
As we have seen, financial privilege only comes into play when amendments are returned by the 
Commons to the Lords. In an environment where the Lords routinely backed down on its 
amendments, friction was therefore unlikely. But if the Lords insists on an amendment or wishes 
to propose an alternative – as has occurred increasingly post-1999 – the question of financial 
privilege becomes more salient. Indeed it was noted earlier that there have been 22 amendments 
in lieu passed by the Lords in response to a financial privilege Reason from the Commons since 
1974. Notably, 21 of these have been since 1997, and 10 since the 2010 general election.42  
 
After the initial change post-1999, financial privilege rose even further up the agenda with the 
establishment of the coalition government in 2010. During Labour’s period in office tensions 
between the chambers were only rarely over explicitly financial matters, and the public finances 
were anyway under no great pressure. Many of the biggest and most protracted conflicts arose 
over issues of civil liberties and constitutional propriety (Russell, 2013). Furthermore, the 
government often gave in – at least in part – to the demands of the Lords, meaning that even if 
financial privilege was engaged, it was not necessarily invoked. Post-2010, the coalition is 
operating in an environment of austerity, and making many controversial spending cuts. And the 
Lords – for the first time in modern history – is opposing broadly from the left. Defeats require 
the support of the Labour opposition, which is naturally resistant to many of the coalition’s 
spending cuts, plus some Crossbenchers and/or government rebels. Policy changes with 
significant financial implications are thus, unlike pre-2010, at the very centre of partisan and 
intercameral conflict. Meanwhile, outside groups that seek to engage with parliament have come 
to focus increasingly on the Lords, given its balanced political make-up and ability to defeat the 
government. Such groups are understandably disappointed if Lords defeats are rejected out of 
hand. 
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All of this explains why financial privilege has become gradually more salient. But it is also 
important to think about the future, and the extent to which tensions could further rise. There 
are two sets of circumstances that may bring financial privilege even more under the spotlight: 
another change of government post-2015, and the possibility of future Lords reform. 
 
Tensions over financial privilege have heightened under the coalition, but could have been far 
worse had the Conservatives formed a single-party government. When Labour was in office the 
Liberal Democrats frequently joined with the Conservatives in bringing about Lords defeats 
(Russell and Sciara, 2007). This party was particularly assertive in pressing such claims, in part 
due to a conviction that the Commons electoral system was fundamentally unfair (see Russell, 
2013: 83, 234). Liberal Democrats have thus been less cautious about preserving conventions, on 
matters such as manifesto bills and delegated legislation. But in 2010 this previously assertive 
party entered government. The coalition is stronger numerically in the Lords than Labour was 
1999-2010, and has (thus far) suffered fewer problems in terms of the Lords returning bills 
repeatedly to the Commons. But a single-party Conservative government would find itself in a 
very different position. If the Liberal Democrats and Labour could join forces (alongside 
Crossbenchers and others) in the Lords, defeats and insistences would almost certainly both 
become more common. Given the traditional dividing lines between left and right (and 
particularly if these occurred in a period of continued austerity), clashes over financial matters 
could become relatively commonplace. The current, somewhat unclear and largely convention-
based, system of financial privilege might well come under significant strain. 
 
The second future scenario is Lords reform. It is widely anticipated that if the Lords were 
reformed to include elected members – as both the coalition and the previous Labour 
government have proposed – it would become more assertive in using its powers. This was a 
particular preoccupation of the joint committee which met to consider the coalition’s draft bill in 
2011-12. Such concerns extended explicitly at times to financial matters. In his written evidence 
to the committee, Labour peer Lord Howarth of Newport for example alleged that “in due 
course, an elected Second Chamber will challenge the financial privilege of the House of 
Commons” (Joint Committee on the Draft House of Lords Reform Bill, 2012b: 99). This 
possibility was also acknowledged by the current Clerk of the House of Commons, Robert 
Rogers, in his oral evidence to the committee (Joint Committee on the Draft House of Lords 
Reform Bill, 2012a: 391). When the bill was debated in the Commons, the rights of an elected 
upper chamber on financial matters were raised several times (e.g. HC Deb 10 Jul 2012, cc216, 
222, 233, 239). The likelihood of a largely or wholly elected replacement for the House of Lords 
may remain low (for a discussion see Russell, 2013), but reform remains very much on the 
political agenda. It could well form part of inter-party negotiations following a close result in 
2015. Should such a reform ever be implemented, the current arrangements for financial 
privilege seem unlikely to hold. 
 
When thinking through the possible reform options, it is thus important to consider both the 
present situation and the future. Financial privilege has become controversial, both inside and 
outside parliament. It has led to allegations – particularly from pressure groups and the media – 
that parliament (i.e. the Lords) is being sidelined in the policy process. But there are bigger 
political questions hanging over this debate: how powerful do we think the unelected (but 
increasingly proportional) second chamber should be on issues of finance, compared to the first? 
To what extent should provisions with financial consequences be treated differently to the rest? 
How could and should the bicameral relationship change if we moved to a more obviously 
democratic second chamber? These are large and imponderable questions, beyond the scope of 
this report. But they necessarily frame any decisions about how the system should be reformed. 
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Financial privilege: what if anything needs to change?  
This report has considered the current operation of financial privilege at Westminster, and some 
of the complaints that have been levelled against the process, plus international comparisons and 
the broader political picture. In this final substantive section we consider what if anything should 
change. We have identified complaints ranging from the opacity of the current process to how 
financial privilege is defined, and ultimately the extent to which it can and should prevent the 
House of Lords from scrutinising government legislation. The latter is obviously a highly 
political question. 
 
Given the range of complaints, there is unlikely to be agreement on a simple set of reforms. But 
it seems clear to us that the present arrangements are unsatisfactory. Even among people closely 
involved with the legislative process (including MPs, peers and parliamentary staff) there is lack 
of clarity about how financial privilege works. It is hard to defend a situation where 
misunderstandings are so rife, and where even determined attempts to establish basic definitions 
prove unsuccessful. At the very least, therefore, more transparency is needed. We begin with this 
point, but acknowledge that a move in this direction would necessarily shine light on other 
aspects which in themselves can be questioned. We thus discuss possible changes in four areas: 
transparency, definitions and boundaries, streamlining the process, and the bigger politics. 
 
Transparency and the process 
The most obvious conclusion based on our research is that far greater transparency is needed 
regarding how financial privilege works. The documents circulated by the clerks following recent 
controversies (Beamish, 2012; Rogers and Sharpe, 2012a; 2012b) have certainly helped, and we 
hope that this report will also do so. But ideally there should be a single authoritative source to 
which parliamentarians, outside groups, journalists and other interested parties can turn. At 
present, a search for the term “financial privilege” within the parliamentary website leads to the 
glossary page (http://www.parliament.uk/site-information/glossary/financial-privilege/), which 
links to a version of the 2012 briefing by the Commons clerks,43 but notably nothing from the 
Lords. The glossary page itself provides no definition (compared, for example, to the entries for 
“Money Bills” or “Parliament Acts”), while the clerks’ memorandum offers no clear indication 
of what falls in or outside the terms of financial privilege, and describes this judgement as 
“normally very straightforward”. Erskine May provides more detail, but is also somewhat unclear 
and is in any case not freely available online. 
 
We recommend that the authorities in both Houses should consider how clearer 
information could be provided on the parliamentary website with respect to financial 
privilege. At a minimum, the current glossary entry should be expanded, and link to 
Lords as well as Commons briefings. Preferably, a more detailed and integrated briefing 
could also be provided in a note from the House of Commons or House of Lords Library 
(or ideally by both acting jointly). In due course, the description in Erskine May might 
also be expanded and clarified. 
 
There is a peculiarity in the arrangements for financial privilege, that these are policed by clerks 
in the Commons, but primarily affect amendments proposed by members of the Lords. This 
helps account for some of the confusion, as peers do not normally have direct contact with 
Commons clerks. One obvious solution might be for Lords clerks to play a bigger part in 
advising members on financial privilege: for example, with respect to whether a specific 
amendment tabled is liable to be judged to engage it. Lords clerks do give such advice to 
members who consider tabling an amendment which risks engaging “unwaivable privilege” (i.e. 
because it applies to a bill for which there is no money resolution or ways and means resolution, 
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or where the terms specified in the resolution do not cover the charge proposed), and would 
therefore be ruled out of order by the Commons Speaker. But while widening this advice might 
seem helpful to peers, it would place the Lords clerks in a difficult position. Fundamentally, it is 
for the Commons to defend its financial privilege, and therefore this must remain for the 
Commons authorities to judge. But if Lords clerks were to constantly seek advice from their 
opposite numbers in the Commons on how to advise peers, this would risk placing too many 
limitations on the Lords. As further developed below, the two chambers may ultimately choose 
to take different positions on the boundaries of financial privilege, and clerks supporting them 
must retain some independence from each other. 
 
We do not believe that clearer briefing for peers should extend to advice being given in 
advance about which specific amendments are likely to engage financial privilege. This 
could in practice only come from the Lords clerks, which could risk them – rather than 
the Commons clerks – being seen to police the system. Yet there is an inherent tension 
in a system where officials in one chamber take decisions which primarily affect 
members in the other. 
 
If Lords clerks cannot work closely alongside peers to identify which amendments are likely to 
engage financial privilege, this risks peers feeling shut out and confused by the decisions taken 
on their amendments. Ultimately, we believe, greater clarity of communication is therefore 
required on the part of the Commons authorities with respect to why amendments are judged to 
engage financial privilege. Such communications could come in the form of a statement relating 
to each amendment, printed at the same time as the order paper for Commons debate. Notably, 
clear statements of this kind are provided in similar circumstances in both Canada and Australia 
(with examples quoted above). Introducing such a system in the UK would aid MPs as well as 
peers, allowing them to raise questions on the floor should they wish. It would clearly increase 
the workload for the Commons Clerk of Legislation (and parliamentary counsel) somewhat, and 
could prove tricky under the compressed timescales of the later stages of ping pong. But such 
pressures could be lessened by other changes, as discussed below. 
 
We believe that peers deserve a clear indication of why their amendments – particularly 
non-government amendments – on occasion engage financial privilege, and this 
information should also be available to MPs. Notably in other similar parliaments 
(Canada and Australia) statements to this effect are published. In the UK the appropriate 
timing for publication of such statements would be before the Commons debate, 
overseen by the Speaker. The work generated would be greatly reduced through clearer 
published definitions of the boundaries of financial privilege and the criteria against 
which amendments are judged, as suggested below.  
 
A more specific question concerns the “de minimis” rule, which we noted earlier is particularly 
unclear. We know that there is such a rule, but cannot identify the threshold. Like the previous 
point, this is partly a problem of definition. But greater transparency would be achieved if (as has 
happened in Canada) some indication was formally given of the sums of money involved. 
 
We believe that it would be reasonable for the amount of expenditure associated with an 
amendment to be included in this statement, as seen above with respect to Canada. 
Realistically, such estimates could only be provided by the government (via 
parliamentary counsel), which might be prone to inflate the costs. But these estimates 
would at least then be open to public examination. 
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Definitions and boundaries 
Much of the difficulty with publishing fuller briefing material comes from the lack of clear 
definitions about which amendments will and will not be judged to engage financial privilege. 
The fullest published statement on this question to date is in Erskine May (24th edn., 2011: 785-
98), but this is hard to interpret in borderline cases and in any case is not readily available to 
most outside observers. Hence there is considerable space for dispute. We uncovered a 
somewhat clearer statement in an unpublished document used by parliamentary counsel 
(reproduced in Appendix 2). But even this is not wholly clear, and cannot be considered 
authoritative. It would obviously be inappropriate for the fullest definition of what the 
Commons authorities will judge to constitute financial privilege to come in a document 
produced by the government, rather than by parliament. This risks blurring the boundaries about 
who is policing financial privilege, which is already the subject of considerable confusion and 
complaint. 
 
We believe that the process would be much improved if the Commons published a clear 
definition, under the auspices of the Speaker, of what it believes constitutes financial 
privilege based on precedent. This would ideally set out clear categories, illustrated by 
examples. It should also set out the “de minimis” rule. Of all of our recommendations, 
we believe that this is the most important. 
 
Producing such a definition might in practice prove difficult, as ultimately such boundaries are 
disputed. As we have seen, some claim that financial privilege is based on “smell”, rather than 
precedent. But the lack of a published definition is difficult to defend, and without one 
controversies are likely to recur.  
 
A second problem, however, is that there may well be disagreement between the two chambers 
over what should be judged to engage financial privilege. Hence this could only be the start of 
the process. While the Commons authorities may define financial privilege in one way, peers may 
not always agree. For example, an amendment which requires increased expenditure (beyond the 
“de minimis” threshold) would be a relatively clear-cut case. But amendments which reduce 
expenditure, or which make changes to administration (e.g. in terms of future parliamentary 
oversight) are far less clear-cut. We have seen that in all three comparable parliaments discussed 
above financial privilege is defined more narrowly, with restrictions applying solely to 
amendments that increase spending. There could be some merit in adopting such a position in 
the UK – though also some counterarguments.44 The Lords might in particular feel that 
restrictions are less justified with respect to purely procedural amendments which neither 
increase nor reduce spending. If peers chose to be bound by some parts of the definition, but 
not others, they would be free to do so – since current arrangements rest on convention alone. 
 
Once the Commons definition has been published, peers may wish to reflect and 
comment upon it, considering whether House of Lords procedures should be revised in 
any way as a result. The natural forum for such discussions could be the House of Lords 
Constitution Committee, followed if necessary by the House of Lords Procedure 
Committee for any detailed implementation.  
 
Ultimately the two chambers may not agree on the definition of amendments with 
financial implications on which the Lords by convention will not insist. If this proves to 
be the case it would be more transparent to admit the disagreement. For example in both 
Canada and Australia it is explicit in the official published documents (the equivalents of 
Erskine May and the Lords Companion) that definitions are interpreted differently in the 
two chambers. The UK documents might in future do the same. 
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While the Lords Companion currently indicates that peers should not insist on amendments 
where the Commons has invoked financial privilege, there is disagreement is over whether the 
Lords can respond with amendments in lieu which “invite the same response”. The Lords has 
never incorporated into the Companion this proposal from the Joint Committee on Conventions 
(2006a: 67), and it is indeed unclear exactly what “invite the same response” means. 
 
If the Lords does not wish to accept the recommendation of the Joint Committee on 
Conventions, it might also be helpful to clarify this in the Companion. Words (even in a 
footnote) such as “Some have argued that the Lords should not offer amendments in lieu 
that ‘invite the same response’, but this principle has not been agreed by the Lords” 
could aid understanding.  
 
Streamlining the process 
The above categories constitute the most important areas where change is needed. But there may 
also be some merit in reforming the process for the Commons claiming financial privilege, to 
bring this more up-to-date. There are two aspects in particular, following our review of the 
process, that seem worthy of consideration. 
 
The first is the giving of Reasons. Currently if a Lords amendment is disagreed by the Commons 
there is a meeting of a Reasons Committee, and where an amendment has engaged financial 
privilege only a financial privilege Reason (rather than anything based on the substance of the 
policy) is given. It has been suggested that this process might be revised, in order that dual 
reasons could be given in such cases – citing financial privilege and also the substantive merits. 
This could help transparency at the margins. But the bigger question is whether in the modern 
age – with televised proceedings and the provision of Hansard – it is necessary to give Reasons 
at all. During the Modernisation Committee inquiry on the legislative process in 2005-06, the 
then Clerk of the Commons Roger Sands proposed abolition of the Reasons Committee, while 
the then First Parliamentary Counsel Stephen Laws suggested that Reasons might be abolished 
altogether (Modernisation Committee, 2006: Ev 128-29, Ev 93). Laws noted that the primary 
purpose of Reasons is to enable the Commons to communicate in cases of financial privilege, 
but that some other alternative might easily be found. The Reasons Committee meanwhile helps 
perpetuate the impression of a shadowy process. Notably in Australia the equivalent committee 
was abolished in the 1990s, and in both Australia and Canada Reasons (or their equivalent) are 
instead agreed more transparently on the floor. 
 
We recommend that the House of Commons Procedure Committee should review the 
current arrangements for providing Reasons on Lords amendments to which the 
Commons disagrees. Options under consideration should include: the abolition of the 
Reasons Committee, the abolition of Reasons altogether, or (if these remain) the giving 
of dual reasons in the case of amendments that engage financial privilege. Since 
financial privilege is automatically invoked if a Lords amendment is rejected by the 
Commons, the abolition of Reasons could be facilitated by indicating on the Lords order 
papers any amendments that were previously identified in the Commons papers as 
engaging privilege. 
 
In addition, we are struck by the extent to which Lords amendments that engage financial 
privilege are dominated by those proposed by the government itself. The majority of agreed 
Lords amendments have explicit government backing, and these are routinely accepted by the 
Commons on the advice of ministers. In such cases, the designation process appears simply to 
take up the time of clerks and parliamentary counsel. It also muddies the waters somewhat with 
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respect to the Commons’ treatment of Lords defeats: as indicated earlier, the official published 
figures give the impression that the Commons almost always waives its financial privilege, when 
in fact most such cases refer to government amendments. One way of streamlining the process 
would be to designate amendments only after the Commons had disagreed to them, but this 
would run counter to the desire for greater transparency – as MPs would not know the financial 
privilege implications of amendments before they voted, and would not have the benefit of 
statements upon them (which in practice would be considered only by the Lords). Yet producing 
such statements on all amendments with financial implications, when in practice government 
amendments are routinely accepted, would significantly add to the workload of parliamentary 
counsel and the Commons clerks. An alternative would be a frank acceptance of the politics of 
the situation – with statements produced on non-government Lords amendments only (whether 
or not the government intends to recommend to the Commons that these should be accepted). 
 
The review of the Commons process should consider whether the current practice of 
designating both government and non-government Lords amendments with respect to 
financial privilege is appropriate. It should also consider whether statements of why an 
amendment engages privilege (as recommended above) should apply to both categories 
of amendment, or to non-government Lords amendments alone. 
 
The bigger politics 
The central difficulty in agreeing procedures and definitions with respect to financial privilege is 
that this forms part of a wider dispute about the appropriate powers of the two chambers in the 
legislative process. As discussed in the previous section, the political environment surrounding 
financial privilege has changed substantially. Since 1999 the House of Lords has become more 
assertive, and various conventions have come under pressure as a result. For example, there have 
been more threats (and some actual examples) of the Lords voting down secondary legislation, 
or government bills at second reading, and the coalition’s Health and Social Care Bill (2010-12) 
was also subject to the first attempt at outright rejection at third reading since 1970 (Russell, 
2013). All three main political parties have sought to stretch the conventions somewhat when in 
opposition. Most recently the Lords has become a key platform for Labour in opposing coalition 
cuts.  
 
Disputes between the two chambers about their respective powers and rights to influence the 
policy process are always likely to be present; indeed, such disputes could be seen as central to 
bicameralism itself. The conventions governing relations between the two chambers are clearly 
fragile, and could become significantly more so in the future. The Joint Committee on 
Conventions (2006a) emphasised that existing conventions might not hold if the Lords were 
further reformed. Similar – albeit perhaps less substantial – pressures may occur if the balance of 
parties in the two chambers changes after a future general election. 
 
It must be recognised that the arrangements for financial privilege rest wholly on 
convention, and are thus susceptible to political pressure and potential erosion over time. 
Such pressures are particularly likely to increase in new political circumstances – 
including a change of government, or Lords reform. 
 
Few would disagree that the elected House of Commons should ultimately have primacy over 
financial matters. But in fact, the House of Commons has primacy over most legislation. This is 
ultimately set down in the Parliament Acts, but is the subject of negotiation at Westminster day-
by-day over Lords amendments, whether they have financial implications or not. Although the 
Lords has become significantly more assertive, it will normally back down in the face of 
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concerted Commons resistance. There is thus a genuine question about the extent to which 
financial matters should be treated differently to other policy objections raised by the Lords. 
 
Except for money bills and bills of aids and supplies, it is clear that the Lords retains significant 
freedom with respect to amendments that have spending implications. There is no limitation on 
these being passed (although it is strongly discouraged by Lords clerks in the special case of 
amendments likely to engage “unwaivable privilege”), while restrictions on the Lords insisting on 
amendments rejected on which the Commons has invoked financial privilege rest purely on 
convention. Some in the Commons might like to see greater restrictions placed on the Lords, for 
example to prevent the agreement of an amendment that would “invite the same response” once 
the Commons has invoked financial privilege. But firm restrictions could only be achieved 
through legislation, which is unlikely – and they could even prove counter-productive, for 
example through the Lords retaliating by failing to pass whole bills. In the past the government 
may have tried to avoid inflaming such tensions, for example, by emphasising that financial 
privilege is a process run by impartial clerks, not ministers, and even proposing minor changes in 
the Commons via amendments in lieu to avoid financial privilege being invoked. While 
arrangements remain as fragile as they currently are, and dependent on convention, this approach 
on the part of government seems advisable. 
 
It must be recognised that arguments about financial privilege are ultimately part of a 
bigger political debate about the powers of the Commons and the Lords, and that for so 
long as arrangements rest on convention they remain extremely fragile. These tensions 
are unlikely to be resolved any time soon – with or without Lords reform. All parties, and 
particularly the government, thus need to apply caution in not inflaming tensions too far. 
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Conclusions 
This report has sought to clarify existing arrangements with respect to financial privilege, and to 
explore whether changes are needed. Through review of parliamentary records and interviews we 
have uncovered a number of complaints about the present system, which have been assessed. 
We have also considered parallel arrangements in other bicameral parliaments. 
 
Although the report does not uncover evidence that financial privilege has been in any way 
“abused”, it nonetheless strongly concludes that there is a need for change. There is an immense 
lack of clarity about existing arrangements, and they are likely to come under increasing pressure. 
As one official suggested to us in interview “financial privilege is a serious bubble waiting to 
burst”. 
 
The biggest problem is a simple lack of transparency. There is no readily available single account 
of how financial privilege works that may be used by parliamentarians, journalists and outside 
groups seeking to influence parliament. Another official described the process as a “meaningless 
ritual not understood by anyone” – which is clearly a very undesirable state of affairs in a 21st-
century parliament. We hope that this report will help at least to some extent to clarify matters. 
But it is no substitute for official material emanating from parliament itself, plus clearer guidance 
to members on a day-to-day basis. 
 
The facts set out in this report go significantly beyond those published in recent briefings from 
the parliamentary authorities and others. In particular, we have highlighted how official 
published statistics tell only half the story. Financial privilege may be “waived” or “invoked”, and 
the former is undoubtedly the course most commonly taken. But previously published figures 
have not clearly distinguished between government amendments in the House of Lords (which 
make up the great majority of those passed), and amendments resulting from government 
defeats in that chamber. In fact financial privilege is invoked almost exclusively on government 
defeats, which have become markedly more common in recent years, and are also more often 
being insisted upon by the Lords. This pushes the question of what the Lords can do with 
respect to such amendments to the fore. The situation has been inflamed further by the key 
battleground between government and opposition (and therefore Commons and Lords) 
becoming one over public spending post-2010. Such arguments may further intensify following 
future political changes – notably a change of government, or Lords reform. 
 
Our conclusion is that the current arrangements for financial privilege are fragile, and in serious 
need of change. Without far greater transparency there will be continued muddle, at the very 
least, and probably further allegations of misbehaviour as well. This risks damaging the 
reputation of parliament. We have suggested publication of clearer definitions, and more explicit 
involvement in the process by the Commons Speaker. Scrapping the most outdated elements of 
the Commons system – the giving of “Reasons” and the Reasons Committee – would probably 
also be a good idea. Adopting a clearer system may require confronting some of the differences 
of interpretation between the two chambers; but this would not in itself be unusual, simply 
bringing us into line with other countries such as Canada and Australia. Yet in the end, financial 
privilege remains governed by convention rather than hard rules, and there is little real restriction 
on what the House of Lords can do. Changing political circumstances, in particular, may bring 
new challenges. 
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Appendix 1: Baroness Royall’s 2009 memorandum 
This is the text of a memorandum deposited by Baroness Royall of Blaisdon (then Leader of that 
chamber) in the Lords Library in February 2009. It was written in response to controversy over 
financial privilege in late 2008, and accompanied by a briefing written by Michael Pownall, then 
Clerk of the Parliaments (subsequently published by the Constitution Committee, 2011: 8-11) 
and some summary statistics about the use of financial privilege (see Table 1, p. 15). 
 
Memorandum by the Leader of the House 
Commons Financial Privilege 
The issue of the use of Commons’ financial privilege was raised at the end of the last session 
during ‘ping-pong’ on the Counter-Terrorism and Planning Bills. 
 
In the debate on these two Bills, strong feelings were expressed in the House on this issue. As 
Leader of the House, I take very seriously the task of upholding the right of this House to debate 
and amend legislation and I undertook to take steps to pursue those concerns. 
 
I did so on the basis that the operation of Commons financial privilege is a matter for the House 
of Commons alone. It is not subject to alteration by this House and therefore, I believe that it 
would not be sensible for this House to review the issue. 
 
My first step was to meet a number of Members who expressed concern in those debates and 
those discussions proved constructive. I have also discussed the issue within the Usual Channels. 
 
At my request, the Clerk of the Parliaments has produced a paper setting out the background to 
how financial privilege works. That paper is attached and makes clear that financial privilege and 
its application is ultimately a matter for the House of Commons. 
 
I also attach some statistics on the recent use of financial privilege. These show that the issue of 
financial privilege has not often given rise to difficulties for the Lords; and Members of the 
House may find it helpful to know that in many cases, the Commons decides not to exert its 
financial privilege. 
 
However, the use of financial privilege comes at the end of a process of dialogue between the 
two Houses. As Leader of the House, I see it as my duty to defend the role of this House, and to 
ensure that that dialogue is respected within Government. I am taking steps to ensure that the 
operation of Government reflects fully the House’s concerns; and that, wherever possible, 
dialogue between the two Houses can be resolved without similar conflicts arising. 
 
I have discussed the issue with First Parliamentary Counsel who I know is very much aware of 
the issue and who has assured me that he will ensure that Government departments are fully 
aware of the implications of financial privilege for policy during the bill drafting process. I have 
ensured that the issue of financial privilege is considered before the text of any Government bill 
is approved for introduction in Parliament. 
 
Finally, I have asked officials in my Office and that of the Chief Whip to give me early warning 
when the issue may arise from dialogue between the two Houses so that I can take steps to 
promote the House’s position within Government. 
 
Baroness Royall of Blaisdon, 10 February 2009. 
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Appendix 2: Parliamentary counsel internal guidance 
The following is taken from internal Office of Parliamentary Counsel guidance about the types 
of amendment that are likely to engage Commons financial privilege. It was provided to us by 
parliamentary counsel in September 2013 in response to an email request. 
 
What kind of Lords amendments will infringe the Commons’ privilege? 
On financial privilege generally, see Erskine May (24th edn) pp 786-788. The Commons take a 
wide view of what matters they consider infringe their privilege. These may include the 
imposition of a charge, an increase or decrease in the amount of a charge, an alteration in the 
duration of a charge, or a change in the administration of a charge. In this context “charge” is 
used to mean either public expenditure or the raising of revenue to meet public expenditure. 
Here are some examples. 
 Amendments about fees chargeable by a public body have been held to engage privilege on 
the basis that the less the body charges by way of fees the more it needs by way of public 
funding. 
 Amendments dealing with commencement arrangements for charging provisions, and 
applying a “sunset” to such provisions, have been designated as infringing privilege. 
 An amendment to change the Parliamentary procedure for secondary legislation making 
financial arrangements (eg changing negative to affirmative, or making Commons-only 
instruments bicameral) will probably be regarded as infringing privilege. 
 Where several clauses, taken together, provide for some new financial arrangement, the 
Commons may regard an amendment to any part of that structure as infringing privilege. 
 
It seems that a Lords amendment can infringe Commons privilege without triggering the need 
for a financial resolution in the Commons. For example, an amendment has been held to involve 
public expenditure large enough to be “significant” for privilege purposes but not large enough 
to cross the “de minimis” threshold for financial resolution purposes. On the other hand, in 
2012 the Commons took the view that a Lords Amendment to the Welfare Reform Bill did not 
engage privilege on the basis that the cost which it involved would be absorbed within the 
normal costs of the Department.  
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At Westminster the House of Commons has primacy over the House 
of Lords on most matters, and this applies particularly with respect to 
finance. Notably if the Lords passes an amendment that could affect 
taxation or spending, MPs may reject it citing the Commons’ “financial 
privilege”; convention then suggests that the Lords should not insist on 
the amendment. Recent claims of financial privilege – most prominently 
on the Welfare Reform Bill in 2012 – revealed significant confusion about 
this procedure, and led to allegations that it had somehow been abused 
by government to unfairly deflect opposition. This report clarifies how 
financial privilege operates, and carefully evaluates the complaints that 
have been made against it. Built on this analysis, plus some consideration 
of arrangements in overseas legislatures, it offers recommendations for how 
arrangements at Westminster could be improved.
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